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Hiding Behind "Tradition"? Should U.S. Vessel
Traffic Centers Exercise Greater Direction and
Control over Vessels in Their Areas?
Craig H. Allen*
In the alermath of the 2007 COSCO BUSAN allision and oil spill, some asked whether
United States Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operators monitoring the developing
incident shouldhave intervenedexplicitly to wam the vessel oreven orderit to take avoidingaction.
The controversycalled to mind a speech by a formerIMO secretary-generalin which he suggested
that those resistinggreatershore-basedcontrol were 'hli'ngbehind tradition." In its investigation
of the COSCO BUSAN incident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) urged the
Coast Guardto better define its expectations regardingthe exercise of VTS control authoiy and
several federal legislatorscosponsored a bill to "clarify"the VTS authority to direct a vessel to
change its course or speed Tis Article examines existing international materials, federal
legislation,regulations,and Coast Guardpolicies on VTS services and concludes that additional
legislationis neithernecessary nor wise. It also concludes,however that current VTS regulations
and policies should be amended to better conform to internationalguidance documents and
standardizedterminology Additionally, VTS operator and supervisor qualification and training
programs should be expanded to ensure competency across the entire continuum of vessel trafflc
management activities.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 7, 2007, the 901-foot, Hong Kong-flagged
containership COSCO BUSAN, outbound in dense fog from Oakland,
California, to Busan, South Korea, allided with the fender system
protecting the Delta Tower support for the San Francisco-Oakland Bay
Bridge. The impact tore a 212-foot-long gash in the vessel's hull,
breaching two of the vessel's fuel tanks and spilling over 50,000 gallons
of oil into the bay. The oil contaminated twenty-six miles of shoreline,
killed an estimated 2500 birds, and temporarily closed a fishery in the
Bay. Although negligence by the vessel's crew and embarked pilot
seemed clear, subsequent investigations by the San Francisco Bay Board
of Pilot Commissioners,' U.S. Coast Guard,2 Department of Homeland
1.
INCIDENT REVIEW COMM., BD. OF PILOT COMM'RS FOR THE BAYS OF S.E, SAN
PABLO & SuISuN, NOVEMBER 7, 2007 ALLISION WITH THE SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND BAY
BRIDGE

(Oct. 23, 2008), availableat http://www.pilotcommission.org/notices/Cota%20IRC%20
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Security (DHS) Inspector General, 3 and NTSB4 left some readers
wondering whether the Coast Guard's San Francisco VTS center should
have taken more assertive action as the vessel deviated from its reported
sailing plan. Among its recommendations, the NTSB urged the Coast
Guard to provide guidance to its VTS personnel that "clearly defines
expectations for the use of existing authority to direct or control vessel
movement when such action is justified in the interest of safety."5 In an
unusual dissent, Safety Board member Deborah Hersman voted against
the report, arguing that the Board's probable cause determination should
have included the Coast Guard's failure to warn the COSCO BUSAN
that it was dangerously close to the bridge.' She wrote, "Although I
accept that my single vote against the final report will not prevent its
issuance by the Board, I will continue to view the report as a regrettable
missed opportunity to thoroughly address marine safety issues that I
expect we will see again."7

Report.pdf. Although the commission did not formally review the conduct of the vessel's crew or
the VTS, its description of the incident raised questions regarding both.
2.
U.S. COAST GUARD, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE ALLISION OF THE COSCO
BUSAN wiTH THE DELTA TOWER OF THE SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE IN SAN
FRANCISCO BAY ON NOVEMBER 7, 2007 (2009), available at http://www.uscg.mil/FOIA/Cosco
Busan/COSCOBUSANfma030609.pdf.
3.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ALLISION OF THE MN COSCO
BUSAN WITH THE SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE (Apr. 9, 2008), availableathttp://www.
dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG 08-38.Apr08.pdf [hereinafter DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT].
4.
See NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT: ALLISION OF HONG
KONG-REGISTERED CONTAINERSHIP MN COSCO BUSAN wITH THE DELTA TOWER OF THE SAN

FRANCISCO-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 7, 2007 (2009),
availableathttp://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2009/MAR090 l.pdf [hereinafter NTSB REPORT].
5.
Id.at 137 (NTSB Recommendation M-09-3).
6.
Id at 139-41 (Board Member Statement: Member Deborah A.P Hersman, dissenting).
Foreshadowing the later findings by a majority of the NTSB, the Inspector General of the
Department of Homeland Security concluded that intervention by the VTS would not have
prevented the allision:
The VTS watchstanders on duty before the accident could not have taken any
additional action that would have prevented the casualty. A time lag between a
maneuver that a vessel is executing and the vessel movement data displayed in the VTS
operations center precluded this possibility. For example, the VTS contacted the pilot
onboard the MN COSCO BUSAN pilot at 8:27 a.m. (see Table 1) to advise him that
the VTS center's equipment indicated that the vessel was on a 235-degree heading; the
pilot informed the VTS operations center that the vessel was executing a turn and that
he was steering 280 degrees. By the time the VTS watchstanders recognized that the
MN COSCO BUSAN appeared to be out of position to pass between the Delta and
Echo columns of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, the vessel had already started
to execute its turn towards the bridge column.
DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supranote 3, at 7.
7.
NTSB REPORT, supranote 4, at 144-45.

TULANE MARITIME LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:91

Even before the NTSB report was released, some members of
Congress introduced bills to "clarify" the authority of Coast Guard VTSs
to issue navigation orders to vessels. One such bill, introduced by
Senator Lautenberg of New Jersey and six cosponsors, would expressly
authorize the Secretary (acting through the Coast Guard) to issue
directions to a vessel to "change the vessel's heading and speed" and
arguably move the United States away from a traffic serfces model and
closer to a traffic controlmodel.8
The COSCO BUSAN incident and the legislative response have
rekindled the debate over the appropriate balance between vessel and
shoreside control over vessel movements, a debate that began even as the
first VTS was established. For some, like former International Maritime
Organization (IMO) Secretary-General William O'Neil, the air traffic
control regime strikes a more appropriate balance between internal and
external control than does the current ship-centric approach, particularly
in light of the increasing volume of marine traffic, vessel size, speed and
passenger capacities, and the enhanced and more accurate operating
picture now available to shoreside VTS center operators.9 For their part,
however, vessel operators and harbor pilots are unlikely to support any
meaningful transfer of vessel control to shoreside VTS controllers, most
of whom do not hold master or pilot licenses l" and are less likely to have

8.
See Oil Spill Prevention Act of 2009, S. 685, 11 1th Cong. § 3 (2009) (cosponsors
include Senators Begich, Boxer, Cantwell, Rockefeller, Snowe, and Vitter). The Bill contains
other provisions addressing fuel oil tank protection, mariner medical standards and credentials,
causation studies, tractor tugs, pollution investigators, and protection of seafarers, none of which
are examined in this Article. See also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND
TRANSPORTATION ON S. 685, S. REP. No. 111-026, at 2, 7 (2009). The new Bill is largely based on
S. 2699, introduced in but not enacted by the 110th Congress.
9.
Two technologies-Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) and Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS)-have significantly enhanced the operating picture available to
vessels and VTS Centers. DGPS-an enhancement of basic GPS available in some areas-is an
all weather satellite-based navigation system that provides position information generally accurate
to within one to three meters. See U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Ctr., DGPS General Information,
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/dgps/Default.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2009). AIS is a shipboard
information broadcast system that acts as a digital signal transponder in the VHF maritime band,
transmitting and receiving vessel identity, position, and other information to and from similarly
equipped vessels and shore stations. See 33 C.ER. § 164.46 (2008); 47 C.ER. § 80.5 (2008);
NATHANIEL BOWDITCH, U.S. NAT'L IMAGERY & MAPPING AGENCY, PuB. No. 9, THE AMERICAN
PRACTICAL NAVIGATOR §§ 2711-2712 (2002). When added to the new generation of solid state
radars that incorporate Doppler technology and high resolution displays, the DGPS-AIS
combination provides VTS operators with a vastly improved operating picture of their area of
responsibility.
10. In some foreign locations, VTS operators hold master's or pilot's licenses. See Int'l
Mar. Org. [IMO], Guidelinesfor Vessel Trafmic Services, IMO Res. A. 857(20) (Nov. 27, 1997),
annex 2, par. 1.1.2 [hereinafter L440 VTS Guidelines]; see also CHARLES W KOBURGER JR.,
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the necessary situational awareness to make, execute, and monitor critical
navigation, collision avoidance, and ship-handling decisions.
In failing to move from a traffic services approach to a traffic
control approach-and therefore closer to the aviation safety model-are
we "hiding behind tradition," as Secretary-General O'Neil charged in a
1999 address to Trinity House?" This Article will explore the legal
regime that currently defines the relationship among vessel masters,
watch officers, pilots, and VTSs, proposed amendments to that regime,
and the policy and implementation issues that any alteration to that
relationship would entail. Although the Article draws on background
international materials, the focus is on the U.S. vessel traffic
management system. The Article concludes that the legislative change
proposals are both unnecessary and unwise. The existing statutory and
regulatory authority strikes the optimal "control" balance between the
vessel and shoreside components and provides needed flexibility. At the
same time, however, the Coast Guard's national and internal VTS
standard operating procedures should be further developed and aligned
with international standards, and then used in conjunction with case
studies and scenarios across the full range of the "continuum of vessel
traffic management" activities to train those same vessel and shoreside
operators.
II. BACKGROUND
VTSs are a vital tool for managing risk in the marine transportation
system. Establishment of a cabinet-level Committee on the Marine
Transportation System (CMTS) in 2004 and the promulgation of the
National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System in 2008
reaffirmed the critical importance of both maintaining an effective,
efficient, and safe Marine Transportation System (MTS) in the United
States 2 and of approaching MTS policy and management from a systems

49 (1986) (reporting that VTS operators in Rotterdam hold a "master's
ticket").
11.
William A. O'Neil, Sec'y-Gen., IMO, Co-ordination of VTS Standards in the United
Kingdom, Speech by the IMO Secretary-General to Trinity House, London (May 12, 1999),
available athttp://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic-id=476&docid=1345; see also IMO,
World Maritime Day 1999, IMO and the New Millennium (1999), available at http://www.imo.
org/includes/blast bindoc.asp?doc
9id-06&format=-PDE
12. The CMTS was established by the President's U.S. Ocean Action Plan of 2004. See
VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS

COMM.ON THE MARINE TRANSP. SYS., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM: A FRAMEwoRK FOR ACTION 57 (July 10, 2008), available atwww.cmts.gov [hereinafter

MTS STRATEGY].
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point of view.'3 The marine transportation "system" comprises vessels,

waterways, ports, intermodal connections, related infrastructure, and
system users. 4 The MTS national strategy document calls for measures
to strengthen marine safety by providing timely, relevant, and accurate
navigation safety information to mariners. VTSs are one of the marine
risk management measures cited by the MTS strategy.'5 In fact, they are
one of the more active external marine risk management measures.'6
Accordingly, this Part of the Article begins with a brief description of the
risk assessment and management principles that inform our design of the
marine safety regime. It then turns to the international and U.S.
frameworks for marine safety, including the frameworks' provisions for
VTSs.
VTSs are only briefly defined by international and U.S. authorities.
The IMO defines VTS simply as "a service implemented by a
Competent Authority, designed to improve the safety and efficiency of
vessel traffic and to protect the environment."' 7 It then adds that "[t]he
service should have the capability to interact with the traffic and to
respondto traffic situations developing in the VTS area."' 8 Similarly, in
the United States, the term VTS refers to services implemented by the
Coast Guard (as the competent authority) that are "designed to improve
the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the
environment."'9 At the very least, the services provided by a VTS include
13. A systems approach to MTS safety, security, and efficiency would, for example,
recognize that vessel traffic services are a tool that supports not just waterways safety, security,
and management, but other systems components as well. Their service to the entire "system"
should be considered in any policy discussion and in cost-benefit analyses.
14.
See TRANSp. RESEARCH BD., THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND THE FEDERAL
ROLE: MEASURING PERFORMANCE, TARGETING IMPROVEMENT-SPECIAL REPORT 279, at 15

(2004).
15. MTS STRATEGY, supra note 12, at 45. Among other things, the national strategy
recognizes that
data integration of Vessel Traffic Services, Automatic Identification Systems (AIS),
electronic charts, and real-time navigational and weather information can create a
comprehensive navigational safety system that significantly improves the quality and
timeliness of safety information.
Id. The strategy does not, however, suggest shifting the responsibility to act on that information
from the mariners to the government.
16.
See generally U.S. COAST GUARD, VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE NATIONAL STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL, COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M16630.3 (2009) [hereinafter
VTS NATONAL SOP]. For an examination of VTS performance issues in the COSCO BUSAN
allision, see NTSB REPORT, supra note 4, at 112-16.

17.
18.
19.
note 9, §§

IMO VTS Guidelines,supra note 10, annex 1, para. 1.1.1.

Id (emphasis added).
33 C.ER. § 161.2 (2008); see also U.S.
2707-2710.

NAT'L IMAGERY & MAPPING AGENCY, supra
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information services. In addition to information services (INS), many

VTSs provide navigation assistance services (NAS) and traffic
organization services (TOS). VTS services are designed to both reduce
risk and facilitate maritime commerce. The latter goal may be
accomplished in partnership with port and vessel operators and marine

exchanges. In the United States, VTS "services" are distinguished from
VTS "management activities," which refer to the means by which the
services are carried out. Management activities include monitoring,
informing, recommending, and directing.2
VTSs and VTS management activities are carried out by shoreside

vessel traffic centers (VTCs).22 VTCs are responsible for such services in
their "Vessel Traffic Service area"; that is, the geographical area
encompassing the specific VTS area of service. 3 In contrast to the air
traffic control system, where coverage is widespread, only a fraction of
the ports and navigable waters in the world (or in the United States) fall
within a VTS service area. Typical VTS architecture includes a range of
VTS services, regulations, guidance documents, and management
measures, along with vessel operating, reporting, communication, and
equipment requirements. " A VTC is typically equipped with com-

munications equipment; a radar system; automatic identification system
(AIS) equipment; closed circuit television cameras (CCTV); meteorological and hydrological equipment; and a data integration, management,
and display system, which may also include decision support tools.25
20. See IMO VTS Guidelines; supranote 10, annex 1,par. 2.3. Each of the "services" is
defined in paragraph 1.1.9 of the Guidelines. See also VTS NATIONAL SOP, supm note 16, para.
2.B.2-B.3, at 2-1 to 2-2. Under the Coast Guard's SOP, information, advice, and warnings fall
within the navigation assistance service category. Id. para. 2.B.2, at 2-1 to 2-2, para. 3.B.4, at 3-2.
The Coast Guard SOP also indicates that the level of service may vary from one CGVTS to
another. Id. para. 2.B, at 2-1 to 2-2.
21.
VTS NATIONAL SOP, supm note 16, para. 2.C, at 2-2. This terminology differs
slightly from the IMO VTS Guidelines. In calling for clarity in communicating VTS intent in any
communications with the vessel, the IMO Guidelines use the terms "advice" where the SOP uses
"recommend"; "instruction" where the Coast Guard SOP uses "direct", and adds a separate
"warning" category. IMO VTS Guidelines, supra note 10, annex 1, para. 2.4.2. The IMO
Guidelines distinguish information from advice in that the former concerns facts while the latter
includes "professional opinion." Id para. 2.5.2.3. The author of one VTS study concluded that
the verb "recommend" was more appropriate than "advice." See Terry Hughes, When Is a VTS
Nota VTS?, 62 J. NA. 439,441 (2009).
22.
33 C.ER. § 161.2.
23. Id.
24.
See id. §§ 161.10-. 12. VTSs may also support the search and rescue, maritime law
enforcement, and national security missions and monitor aids to navigation and anchorages. The
IMO VTS Guidelines refer to these as "allied services." See IMO VTS Guidelines; supranote 10,
annex 1,para. 1.1.10.
25. The "VTS" acronym is, on occasion, also used to refer to vessel traffic systems-that
is, information integration, display, and management and decision support systems adapted to
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Finally, no VTS system could function without a trained professional
staff.
A.

RiskAssessment,Analysis, andManagementPlinciples

Risk assessment refers to the systematic approach to risk
identification, analysis, and management.26 Risk identification generally
begins with actual and hypothetical accident scenarios that are used to
scope the parameters of the risk. In the risk analysis step, the accident
scenarios are evaluated to estimate risk probabilities and consequences.
Risk management refers to the process of establishing risk tolerance
criteria and
selecting and implementing risk elimination and reduction
27
measures.

Marine risk management incorporates both internal measures
undertaken by the risk-creating party engaged in the activity and external
measures taken by others. Internal risk management measures can be
voluntary or required by law. External risk management measures may
be provided by private service providers or by a government agency. The
government agency may or may not impose user fees to defray the cost
of its services. 8 The current approach to risk management is often
vessel traffic management. In the early 1990s, the Coast Guard and its contractor developed the
"Coast Guard Vessel Traffic System," an operating system that integrated VTS inputs and
transmitted them to the vessel traffic centers. See Ulysses Mullins, Leveraging Technology To
Improve VTS Operations,COAST GUARD J. OF SAFETY & SECURITY AT SEA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MARINE SAFETY & SECURITY COUNCIL, Summer 2007, at 16-17. In 1996, the Coast Guard
launched the Ports and Waterways Safety System (PAWSS) VTS Improvement and
Standardization Project, largely to permit the integration of AIS data into the VTS system. The
new system is based on the Marine Traffic Management 200 (MTM 200) system developed by
Lockheed Martin Corporation. See U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Ctr., Ports and Waterways
Safety System, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/mwv/vts/PAWSS.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2009); see
also NTSB REPORT, supra note 4, at 69 (reporting that because of funding constraints in the early
2000s, only six of the eight larger VTS locations received the full version of the MTM 200
system; as a result, on the day of the COSCO BUSAN incident VTS San Francisco lacked the
decision-support functions of the full MTM 200 system).
26. See generally MARINE BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC), MINDING THE HELM:
MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING ch. 4 (1994). Risk is defined as the product of the probability
of a casualty and its consequences. See U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Ctr., Ports and Waterways
Safety Assessment, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/mwv/projects/pawsa/PAWSAhome.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2009); TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., RISK OF VESSEL ACCIDENTS AND SPILLS IN THE
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS: DESIGNING A COMPREHENSIVE RISK ASSESSMENT-SPECIAL REPORT 293, at
28-29 (2008). Alternatively, risk is characterized as a function of the probability of an event, the
severity of its consequences, and the period of exposure to the risk. U.S. COAST GuARD,
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT, COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 3500.3, para. 7.B (1999).
27. The goal is to eliminate risk when practicable and to manage risks that cannot be
eliminated by developing and evaluating alternative risk reduction and mitigation strategies or by
reducing vulnerabilities.
28. The decision whether to provide a service is distinct from the decision on how it
should be funded. The need for the service is generally analyzed using a cost-benefit analysis.
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' with responsibility for some of those layers
described as "layered,"29
assigned to risk generators, such as ship operators, while other layers are
established and maintained by other service providers or those whose
property or resources are vulnerable. Risk management "layers" may be
active or passive.
In order to determine what kind and level of management measures
are appropriate in a given risk environment, public and private
organizations dedicated to marine safety have employed a variety of risk
assessment approaches. In the 1990s, the IMG formulated the Formal
Safety Assessment (FSA) approach to risk management, which provided
the IMO member. states with a common language and approach to
regulatory risk management." FSA, as further developed and refined in
2002, is a rational and systematic process for assessing the risks
associated with any sphere of activity and for evaluating the costs and
benefits of the various options for reducing those risks." FSA consists of
five steps: (1) identification of hazards/accident scenarios, (2) risk
analysis, (3) generating risk control options, (4) cost-benefit assessments
of the options, and (5) recommendations for the decision maker.32
Because FSA is grounded in rational cost-benefit analysis, regulatory
measures justified by FSA are more likely to attract buy-in by states and
private entities who will be asked to fund the implementation of those
measures.

The government may choose to provide a service justified by cost-benefit analysis when "market
failure" would otherwise result by not providing the service. Market failure is commonly found
in the case of public goods. See DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS:
CONCEPTS AND PRACnCE ch. 5 (4th ed. 2005). The cost of public goods can, however, be funded
in whole or part by user fees. For example, in the United Kingdom, vessel operators pay "light
dues" to defray the cost of aids to navigation. See Alistair Osborne, ShippingLines Aghast'over
UK Light Dues Rise, THE TELEGRAPH, June 14, 2009 (on-line version), available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/5533692/Shipping-lines-aghast-overUK-light-dues-rise.html (reporting ship operators' complaints over proposed significant increase
in light dues based on ships' tonnage).
29. The origin of the "layered" approach concept--sometimes likened to multiple layers
of Swiss cheese, each serving as a barrier against risk-is generally attributed to James T.
Reason. See JAMES T REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 9 (1997).
A risk vector must penetrate each "layer" of the safety or security system in order to reach its
"target*"
30.
See J.H. Peachley, Managing Risk Thmugh Legislation, in MANAGING RISK IN
SHIPPING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 92, 93-94 (Nautical Inst. ed., 1999) (explaining FSA history and

processes).
31.
See IMO, Guidelinesfor FormalSafety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the 1MO RuleMaking Process MSC Circ. 1023 (Apr. 5, 2002), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blast
DataOnly.asp/datajid%3D5111/1023-MEPC392.pdf.
32.
Seeid.annex, para. 3.1.1.
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Consistent with DHS's risk-based approach to decision making,"
the Coast Guard employs a variety of risk assessment and management
tools to promote the safety and security of the marine transportation
system, including the system's waterway components. The Coast Guard
also practices risk management in its own operations. Examples of
Coast Guard operational risk management tools can be found in several
U.S. Coast Guard instructions on the subject promulgated by the
Commandant, partly in response to recommendations by the NTSB.'
Some navigation risk management decisions are strategic, such as
whether the Long Range Navigation (LORAN) system should be
maintained as a backup to the Global Positioning System (GPS). Others
are operational, such as whether vessel movements in San Francisco Bay
should be delayed or restricted on a particular day due to dense morning
fog. The longer lead times available for strategic risk management
decisions enable the use of more formal tools. For example, in carrying
out the waterways management mission, the Coast Guard's Ports and
Waterways Safety Assessment (PAWSA) tools provide a disciplined
approach for identifying major waterway safety hazards, estimating risk
levels, evaluating potential mitigation measures, and setting the stage for
implementation of selected measures to reduce risk." The assessment
evaluates both current risk mitigation measures and potential new ideas.36
Such measures may include a mix of visual and electronic aids to
navigation and vessel traffic management measures designed to provide
the optimal level of safety for that waterway. A similar but less
comprehensive tool, the Waterways Analysis and Management System
(WAMS), focuses on aids to navigation issues. Other situation-specific
approaches used by the Coast Guard include the congressionally

33.

See TODD MASSE ET AL., The Department of Homeland Secutity4 Risk Assessment

Methodology.- Evoluon, Issues, and Optons for Congress, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, REP.
RL 33858 (Feb. 2, 2007).

34. See, e.g., U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 26, para. 4 (pointing out that the instruction
was promulgated in response to NTSB recommendations arising out of four major marine
mishaps between 1991 and 1993).
35.

See U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Ctr., supra note 26.

A 2008 PAWSA for San

Francisco Bay concluded that the risks were judged to be well balanced with existing mitigation
measures, including existing vessel traffic management measures. See U.S. COAST GUARD
SECTOR SAN FRANCISCO, PAWSA WORKSHOP REPORT FOR SAN FRANCISCO, 12-13 AUGUST 2008,

at 20-21, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/mwv/projects/pawsa/WorkshopReports/PAWSA%20work
shop%20report/o2OSF%20August 0 /202008.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2009).
36. See Brian Tetreault & Keith Pierre, Stakeholder-DrivenRisk Management The Ports
and Waterways Safety Assessment: A Risk-Based Decision Making Tool for Waterways
Management COAST GUARD J. SAFETY & SECURITY AT SEA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARINE
SAFETY & SECURITY COUNCIL, Spring 2007, at 69-71.
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on VTSs (discussed below) and
mandated Port Needs Studies focused
37
Port Access Route Studies (PARS).
B.

The InternationalFramework

For more than two decades, the United States has joined with other
concerned states and the maritime community to develop a coherent,
consistent, and efficient approach to VTSs sourced in international law
and internationally agreed upon guidance documents. Any examination
of the international framework for vessel traffic management must begin
with the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The
Convention is widely viewed as a constitutive instrument which provides
a basic legal framework that was designed to be complemented by
additional international agreements, most of which are developed
through the IMO. The two IMO-sponsored conventions of principal
relevance to VTS issues are the International Convention on the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping of Seafarers (STCW), both of which are
briefly examined below. The 1MO Assembly issued its first guidance on
vessel traffic services in 1985.38 In the ensuing quarter century, VTS
provisions were added to the SOLAS Convention, incorporated into
more recent 1MG Assembly and committee resolutions, and further
developed through joint efforts by the IMO and the International
Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
(IALA)29

Port Access Route Studies (PARS) are employed in designating offshore fairways and
37.
traffic separation schemes. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(c) (2006) (requiring the secretary to designate
necessary fairways and traffic separation schemes to provide safe access routes to and from ports
or other places in the United States).
IMO, Guidelinesfor Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Res. A.578(14) (Nov. 20, 1985).
38.
The 1985 Guidelines, which built upon the foundation laid by a 1968 resolution (IMO,
Recommendations on PortAdvisory Services, IMO Res. A. 158(ES.IV) (1968)), were updated in
1997. See IMO VTS Guidelines, supra note 10. They now make it clear that decisions
concerning effective navigation and maneuvering of the vessel remain with the ship's master. The
Guidelines also highlighted the importance of pilotage in a VTS and reporting procedures for
ships passing through an area where a VTS operates. Id. annex 1, para. 2.6; see also G. Kop,
GeneralPrinciplesof VTS and the IMO Guidelines, in THE NAUTICAL INSTrIUTE ON PILOTAGE
AND SHIPHANDLING 205, 207-08 (David J. Sanders ed., 1990).
39.
See INT'L ASS'N OF MARINE AIDS To NAVIGATION & LIGHTHOUSE AUTHS. (IALA),
VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES MANUAL (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter JALA MANUAL].
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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

UNCLOS, completed in 1982 and in force since 1994,4' assigns
primary responsibility for vessel navigation safety to the vessel's flag
state.4 ' At the same time, coastal states and port states have the
jurisdiction and, in some cases, a duty to undertake marine safety and
pollution prevention measures.4 2' The Convention provisions applicable
to vessel traffic management and control are principally concerned with
the ocean areas lying seaward of the coastal state's baseline. It is
therefore of limited relevance to VTS measures within the internal waters
of a state, where the state generally enjoys broad jurisdiction over foreign
nonpublic vessels.4'3 The Convention imposes a limited duty on coastal
states to provide information services to vessels in their territorial sea."
Beyond such information services, however, the Convention limits the
applicability of coastal state vessel traffic management measures in the
state's territorial sea or exclusive economic zone. For example,
UNCLOS restricts coastal state jurisdiction over foreign vessels in
innocent passage through the state's territorial sea or in transit passage
through an international strait.4'5 Article 21 of UNCLOS permits a
coastal state to adopt laws and regulations relating to foreign vessels in
innocent passage through the territorial sea where, inter alia, such laws
respect the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic.
Those laws must, however, be in conformity with other relevant
provisions of UNCLOS and other applicable international law, 6 and they
cannot have the effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent

40.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.TS. 3 [hereinafter

UNCLOS].
41.
Id. art.94.
42.
See, e.g., id. arts. 24, 194,211,219.
43.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 111 (June 27)
(affirming state sovereignty over ports and internal waters). Other conventions, such as SOLAS,
or bilateral treaties may impose limits. See also IALA, Guidelines and Criteria for Vessel Traffic
Services in Inland Waters, IALA Recommendation V-120 annex (2001).
44.
UNCLOS, supm note 40, arts. 24(2) (requiring that the coastal state "shall give
appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial
sea"), 44 (adding similar duty for states bordering international straits), 54 (expanding article 44

duty to states bordering archipelagic sea lanes).
45.
Id arts. 17-28, 34-42. The U.S. Ports and Waterways Safety Act respects these
restrictions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(d) (2006) (generally exempting foreign vessels in innocent or

transit passage from the Act except where authorized by a treaty or where the vessel is destined
for or departing from a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States); see also 33
C.ER. §§ 160.103(c), 164.02 (2008) (providing exemptions for certain foreign vessels in innocent

or transit passage).
46. UNCLOS, supranote 40, art. 2 1(1).
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passage.47 Similar limitations apply to coastal state measures applicable
to vessels transiting international straits lying within the state's territorial
sea. 8 Article 25 of the Convention recognizes the coastal state's right to
prescribe conditions for entry into its internal waters and ports and to
take necessary steps to prevent a breach of those conditions by foreign
vessels. 9 Although compulsory VTSs cannot be established beyond the
coastal state's territorial sea, the Convention requires all states to promote,
through the IMO, the adoption of ships' routing systems where needed to
minimize the threat of accidents which might cause environmental
pollution. 5 ° Thus, UNCLOS provides the overall framework for
navigation safety measures within or beyond a coastal state's territorial
waters, while other treaties or conventions-most notably the SOLAS
Convention-provide greater detail.
2.

The Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS)

The 1974 International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea,"
together with its 1978 Protocol,52 amendments, and codes, is the bestknown source for the generally accepted international standards
pertaining to vessel construction, design, equipment, and manning
(CDEM). Within the SOLAS CDEM framework, vessel navigators have
witnessed a rapid proliferation and integration of sensors (radar,
fathometer, GPS, electro-optical, infrared, and television) and displays
(radar, automatic radar plotting aids (ARPA), Electronic Chart Display
and Information Systems (ECDIS), 3 and AIS), and vessel status
monitors and alarms. At the same time, there has been an effort to
network those sensors and displays into distributed ship-to-shore

47. Id.art. 24(l).
48. Id arts. 41 (sea lanes and traffic separation schemes), 42 (coastal state laws relating to
transit passage).
49. Id. art. 25(2); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1228 (providing authority for the Secretary to
prescribe conditions for entry to ports in the United States).
50. UNCLOS, supra note 40, art. 211(1).
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
51.
T.I.A.S. 9700, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2 (as amended) [hereinafter SOLAS].
52. Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974, Feb. 17, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 5577, T.I.A.S. 10009, 1226 U.N.T.S. 237.
53. In 2004, Congress granted the Coast Guard authority to promulgate regulations
requiring the carriage of electronic charts on certain vessels. See Act of Aug. 9, 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-293, tit. I, § 410, 118 Stat. 1042, 1045 (codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1223a). In 2009, the
IMO Maritime Safety Committee adopted amendments to SOLAS Regulation V/19 to make the
carriage of ECDIS mandatory. The requirement will be phased in from 2012-2014. IMO Res.
MSC.282(86), para. 5 (June 5, 2009). In the meantime, ECDIS is recognized as an alternative to
the paper chart carriage requirements. Id.par. 3.
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intelligence systems.' In response to these trends, the emerging "eNavigation" concept, under development by the IMO and IALA,
envisions "the harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation
and analysis of maritime information onboard and ashore by electronic
means to enhance berth to berth navigation and related services, for
safety and security at sea and protection of the marine environment.""
Although the first goal-enhancement and integration of on board
sensors and displays into a virtual alphabet soup of information devices
spanning DGPS, ARPA, AIS, and ECDIS-is rapidly developing, the
second goal-distributing that information to shoreside centers-has
generally not kept pace, resulting in asymmetrical access to information.
The SOLAS Chapter V regulations that address operational safety
of navigation measures reflect the IMO member states' acknowledgement that marine risk management efforts must extend beyond vessel
CDEM measures. Accordingly, SOLAS now includes, inter alia,
provisions for offshore vessel reporting and routing systems established
in compliance with international standards and procedures,56 along with
more active vessel traffic service measures. Requirements for voyage
planning (discussed below) were also added to SOLAS in 2002."
In addressing the role of VTSs in the international marine safety
regime, SOLAS Regulation V/12, which was adopted by the IMO in
2002, states:
1. Vessel traffic services (VTS) contribute to safety of life at sea, safety
and efficiency of navigation and protection of the marine
54. For an early description of the future vision, see Martha R. Grabowski, Distributed
IntelligentNavigation Systems, MARINE TECH., July 1999, at 175-82.
55. IMO, Development ofan E-Navigation Strategy, IMO Doc. NAV 53/WP.4, para. 3.1
(2007) (submission by IALA).
56. Offshore ship routing and reporting schemes are authorized, subject to IMO approval,
by Regulations 10 and 11 of Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention. If approved by the IMO, such
measures can extend beyond the territorial sea. The IMO has set out general principles and
guidelines on ship reporting systems in IMO Resolution A.851(20) (Dec. 2, 1997). "Ships'
routing systems" refers to any system of one or more routes or routing measures aimed at
reducing the risk of casualties, including traffic separation schemes, two-way routes,
recommended tracks, areas to be avoided, inshore traffic zones, roundabouts, precautionary areas,
deep-water routes, and, for certain waters, archipelagic sea lanes. See Introductionto IMO, SHIPs'
ROUTEING, at xi (9th ed. 2008). Some reporting and routing measures are administered by vessel
traffic centers, leading some mariners to confuse what is only a reporting or routing scheme,
which is generally considered "passive:' with the "active" VTS scheme, which generally includes
services not ordinarily available under reporting and routing schemes. See Hughes, supra note
21, at 442 (observing that some centers administer mandatory ship reporting systems, but do not
provide all VTS services to vessels, potentially misleading participating vessels who assume such
services will be provided).
57.
See SOLAS, supra note 51, reg. V/34.

2009]

U.S. VESSEL TRAFFIC CENTERS

environment, adjacent shore areas, work sites and offshore
installations from possible adverse effects of maritime traffic.
2. Contracting Governments undertake to arrange for the establishment
of VTS where, in their opinion, the volume of traffic or the degree of
risk justifies such services.
3. Contracting Governments planning and implementing VTS shall,
wherever possible, follow the guidelines developed by the
Organization. The use of VTS may only be made mandatory in sea
areas within the territorial seas of a coastal State.
4. Contracting Governments shall endeavour to secure the participation
in, and compliance with, the provisions of vessel traffic services by
ships entitled to fly their flag.
5. Nothing in this regulation or the guidelines adopted by the
Organization shall prejudice the rights and duties of Governments
under international law or the legal regimes of straits used for
international navigation and archipelagic sea lanes. 8
International standards for VTSs are further established by the VTS
Guidelines set out in IMO resolutions, most recently updated in 1997."
In recognizing the need for internationally approved guidelines for VTSs,
the IMO drew attention to the fact that use of differing VTS procedures
might confuse masters of vessels whose voyages take them from one
VTS area to another.' The IMO VTS Guidelines are designed to be
implemented in conjunction with other IMO guideline documents and
the JALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual.6 '
Internationally recognized guidance on VTS watchstander training
has been promulgated by both the IMO and IALA. The IMG guidance is
set out in Annex 2 of the IMG VTS Guidelines.62 IALA guidance is set
out in IALA Recommendation V-103.'3 In 2000, the IMG noted the
development of the IALA recommendations and invited member states
to bring those recommendations to the attention of their VTS
authorities. ' As a result, the IALA standards are now generally
58.
Id.reg. V/12. Although SOLAS indicates that participation in a VTS may only be
made mandatory where the VTS lies within the coastal State's territorial sea, SOLAS does not
limit a State's jurisdiction to establish mandatory VTSs within its internal waters.
59. IMO VTS Guidelines, supra note 10. Annex 1 of the resolution establishes the
Guidelines and Criteria for VTS.
60. Id
61.
IALAVTS MANUAL, supranote 39.
62. IMO VTS Guidelines,supra note 10.
63. IALA, Standards for Training and Certification of VTS Personnel, IALA
Recommendation V-103 (May 1998). It describes three model courses: operator basic training,
supervisor advancement training, and on-the-job training. Id.ch. 6.
64. IMO, IALA Standardsfor Trainingand Certificationof Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
Personnel,MSC Circ. 952 (May 30,2000).
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recognized as the primary training and certification standards for VTS
personnel.
3.

The STCW Convention and Code

The 1978 Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) entered into force in 1984.65 The
Convention was completely revised in 1995, when the STCW Code was
added. ' As its title suggests, the STCW Convention establishes
international standards for mariner license qualifications and training, as
well as deck and engineering watchstanding standards. The STCW
Convention imposes obligations on the shipowner or operator, the ship's
master, and watch officers.6 7 As such, STCW prescribes internal risk
management measures that must be considered in any examination of
existing or proposed external risk management measures, such as VTS.
The STCW Code is divided into two parts. Part A contains
mandatory provisions, while Part B consists of recommended guidance.
The STCW Convention and Code, like SOLAS, make it clear that
responsibility for navigation safety is shared by the vessel's master, watch
officer, and embarked pilot, with the master bearing ultimate
responsibility."
Chapter VIII of the STCW Code sets out the standards regarding
watchkeeping. The Code includes requirements regarding voyage
planning, principles to be observed in keeping a navigational watch,
performance of the navigational watch, watchkeeping in restricted
visibility and in congested waters, and navigation with a pilot on board.
Although VTS issues are certainly relevant to many of the watchkeeping
practices described in the STCW Code, the Code does not directly
address navigation within a VTS.
The evolving requirement for predeparture vessel voyage planning,
as an integral component of a vessel's internal risk management,'
65. Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,
July 7,1978, 1361 UN.T.S. 190 (as amended) [hereinafter STCW Convention].
66.
See Seafarers' Training Certification and Watchkeeping Code Adopted as Resolution
2, by the 1995 Conference of Parties to the STCW Convention, July 7, 1995, 1969 U.N.T.S. 41,
67 [hereinafter STCW Code]. The STCW Code and STCW Convention are reprinted in Int'l
Mar. Org. Pub. No. 1B938E (2001). Federal regulations implementing the STCW Convention
and Code are codified at 46 C.ER. §§ 15.1101-.1111 (2008).
67.
STCW Convention, supra note 65, reg. I.
68.
See STCW Code, supra note 66, § A-VIII/2, pt. 3-1, para. 49; SOLAS, supra note 51,
reg. XI-2/8.
69. In the course of e-Navigation discussions, some have suggested a future where
voyage plans are produced by shoreside "slot management" authorities and transmitted to the
vessels for uploading and execution.
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extends to the vessel's navigation through areas covered by a VTS.
Requirements for voyage planning are incorporated into both the SOLAS
and STCW Conventions, as well as in implementing IMO resolutions.
SOLAS Regulation V/34, which was added to SOLAS in 2002,0
imposes a duty on the master to ensure that the intended voyage has been
planned using the appropriate nautical charts and nautical publications
for the area concerned, taking into account the guidelines and
recommendations developed by the IMO.7 SOLAS thus works hand-inhand with overlapping risk assessment and management measures set out
in the STCW Code's provisions on watchkeepingY Voyage or passage
planning is divided into four stages: appraisal, planning, execution, and
monitoring. 3 Requirements for voyage planning extend from "berth-toberth";74 that is, from the point where the vessel gets underway from a
pier or anchorage until it arrives at the destination pier or anchorage.75
Accordingly, for vessels engaged in voyages that extend beyond a state's
internal waters, the voyage planning requirements extend to waters
within VTS areas and to each stage of the ship's passage from appraisal
and planning to execution and monitoring.
C

The US.Framework

Although not yet a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,"
the United States is a charter member of both the SOLAS and STCW
Conventions and is fully engaged in developing the marine safety regime
with the other member states of the IMO and IALA. At the same time,
the United States has, since 1983, recognized that the UNCLOS
navigation and overflight provisions confirm existing maritime law and

70. SOLAS chapter V applies to "all vessels"; however, member states may decide to
what extent chapter V applies to ships operating solely in their internal waters. SOLAS, supra
note 51, reg. V/l(2).
71.
Id. reg. V/34(l). With respect to towing vessels, the Coast Guard only requires
voyage plans of those vessels the intended voyage of which extends to waters lying seaward of the
territorial sea baseline. See 33 C.FR. § 164.80(c)(3).
72. STCW Code, supm note 66, § A-VIII!2, pt. 2 (voyage planning).
73. IMO, Guidelines for Voyage Planning,IMO Res. A.893(21), para. 1.3 (Nov. 25,
1999). The resolution uses the terms "voyage planning" and "passage planning" interchangeably.
74. Id. (establishing a berth-to-berth scope of the planning process); see also 33 C.F.R.
§ 161.19 (establishing a distinct "sailing plan" requirement).
75. IMO Res. A.893(2 1), supm note 73, para. 3.1.
76. The Treaty was presented to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent in 1994.
Despite support by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations and favorable reports by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on two occasions, the full Senate has yet to vote on the
convention.
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fairly balance the interest of all states. 7 Thus the foregoing discussion of
the international legal framework and the involved international
organizations serves as an overarching framework for the U.S. regime.
At least since 1972, Congress has charged the Coast Guard with
responsibility for promoting marine safety and regulating vessel traffic
on the navigable waters of the United States.78 In describing the Coast
Guard's role in protecting and promoting the nation's marine
transportation system, the Transportation Research Board identified two
distinct levels of management: active and passive.
The most common is passive management, in which the Coast Guard
establishes the navigation aids and "rules of the road." The second, more
active level of management requires vessels of a certain size and function
to report their locations to the vessel traffic service (VTS) center and to
monitor certain radio frequencies while operating in designated areas. The
VTS centers provide marine advisories and traffic information; they also
advise on routing and vessel separation distances. 79
Adopting the systems approach set out by the MTS strategy
introduced above, the Coast Guard and its federal, state, and local
partners implement a variety of risk management measures applicable to
vessels, waterways, and adjacent infrastructure, such as ports, terminals,
and bridges. Waterways management measures include services like
dredging, fixed and floating aids to navigation, electronic navigation
services, bridge administration, the provision of navigational charts and
publications, and meteorological, hydrographic, hydrological, and
oceanographic data services. In addition, the federal government has
established an elaborate regulatory system that includes-consistent with
the international framework-rules of the nautical road, navigation safety
regulations, vessel CDEM standards, and mariner licensing qualifications and requirements.
The principal authority for the Coast Guard's waterways
management program is the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) of
1972."0 The Act applies to the navigable waters of the United States (out
77.
See Statement by the President on U.S. Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DocS.
383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
78.
See generally 6 U.S. COAST GUARD, MARINE SAFETY MANUAL, COMMANDANT
INSTRUCTION M16000.11 (series) [hereinafter MARINE SAFETY MANUAL], availableathttp://www.

uscg.mil/directives/cini/16000-16999/CIM_16000! 1.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). Chapter 4
of the manual describes the service's vessel traffic management activities; section 4.G addresses
VTSs.
TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supranote 14, ch. 3.
79.
80. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (July 10, 1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (2006)) [hereinafter PWSA]. Selected legisla-
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to twelve nautical miles) " and, in some cases, to the "marine
environment" which includes the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic
zone of the United States.82 The PWSA, as amended, provides authority
for the Coast Guard to prescribe vessel equipment and operating
requirements, as well as vessel traffic management and control measures.
Those measures include a variety of vessel reporting, routing, and
management measures in both internal and offshore waters. 3
1.

U.S. Navigation Safety Framework: The Navigation Safety
Regulations

Exercising its authority under the PWSA, the Coast Guard
promulgated the navigation safety regulations (NSRs) in 1977." The
NSRs were originally applicable only to vessels of 1600 or more tons
while operating on U.S. navigable waters.85 In response to several high
profile pollution incidents involving towed oil barges, selected
requirements of the NSRs were extended to certain towing vessels in
1996.6 Because the NSRs apply to vessels operating in all navigable
waters of the United States (except certain waters of the St. Lawrence
Seaway8 7), the equipment requirements and procedures they prescribe

must be considered in any examination of the VTS role in marine risk
management in the United States.
The NSRs require that vessels (depending on type and tonnage)
carry designated charts and nautical publications and be equipped with
certain equipment, including radar, ARPA, compasses, fathometer,
electronic position fixing devices, and AIS. They also require that the
wheelhouse be constantly manned by persons who evaluate the danger of
tive history, including S. REP. No. 92-724 and CONF. REP. No. 92-1178, are reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2766-2814.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1222(5). The Act was extended to the full extent of the twelve-nauticalmile territorial sea by the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1998. See Pub. L. No. 105-383, tit.
II,§ 301(a), Nov. 13, 1998, 112 Stat. 3411, 3417.
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1222(1).
83.
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 160.201 (2008) (requiring ships to report advance notice of
arrival); id. pt. 165 (regulated navigation areas); id pt. 167 (offshore traffic separation
schemes);id pt. 169 (ship reporting systems); 33 U.S.C. § 1230(d).
84. 33 C.ER. pt. 164; see U.S. Coast Guard, Final Rules, Navigation Safety Regulations,
42 Fed. Reg. 5956 (Jan. 31, 1977).
85. 33 C.F.R. § 164.01(a). A violation of the NSRs constitutes statutory fault. See W
Pac. Fisheries v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984). Such violations may
also result in an owner losing the statutory limitation of liability for a resulting oil spill under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(B).
86.
See 33 C.ER. §§ 164.72-.82.
87. Id. § 164.01(a).
88. See id §§ 164.30-.38, .41, .43, .46, .72.
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each closing visual contact and fix the vessel's position, plot that position
on a chart, inform the person directing the movement of the vessel of the
vessel's position, and provide certain ship maneuvering information to
the pilot.89 Fixes are to be obtained using electronic and other
navigational equipment, external fixed aids to navigation, geographic
reference points, and hydrographic contours." In addition, the NSRs
include detailed criteria for determining safe speed. 9' The NSRs
complement the standards regarding the master-pilot relationship
prescribed by the STCW Code and IMO resolution and likewise require
the crew to take and plot fixes and to notify the person directing the
movement of the vessel of the results.92
2.

U.S. Vessel Traffic Service Framework

Privately operated marine exchanges provided an early version of
VTSs in the United States, receiving advance reports on vessel
movements and relaying them to pilots, tugs, and port agents. The
concept of monitoring and even managing ship movements using shorebased radar was first established by the British Admiralty in Liverpool,
England, in the late 1940s; it was more fully developed in Rotterdam in
1956. 9" The United States first experimented with a radar surveillance
system in Long Beach, California, in 1950, 9" which was followed by the
voluntary Harbor Advisory Project (HARP) in San Francisco in 1968.
The 1971 collision between the tankers ARIZONA STANDARD and
OREGON STANDARD under the Golden Gate Bridge, which resulted
in the discharge of over 800,000 gallons of oil while the HARP "advisory"
watchstanders stood helplessly by, served as a catalyst for congressional
89. Id. § 164.1l(a)-(c).
90. Id § 164.1 (d).
91.
See id § 164 .11 (p) (listing eight factors to be considered in determining safe speed).
In addition, Rule 6 of the international and inland rules of the road sets out a nonexhaustive list of
twelve factors to be considered by radar equipped vessels in determining "safe speed." These
factors, and how the necessary information is determined, should be considered in any analysis of
the practicality of a shoreside VTS operator directing a vessel to change its speed. Pilots and ship
masters are also more likely to understand speed reductions and, in particular, the all-back-full
order is generally an ineffective means of avoiding collision. See JOHN W DEVANNEY IlI ET AL.,
TANKER SPILLS, COLLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS, MASS. INST. OF TECH., SEA GRANT PROGRAM,

REPORT No. MITSG 79-14, at 2-8 (June 1979) ("The fact that slowing down the engines is a
completely ineffective maneuver once a ship is in trouble is hardly an original observation.").
92. 33 C.ER. § 164.1 1(c).
93.
See US. Coast Guard Navigation Ctr., History of Vessel Traffic Services, http://www.
navcen.uscg.gov/mwv/vts/history.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2009); NTSB REPORT, supra note 4,
app. B.
94. See IMO, Vessel Traffic Services, http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topicid=387 (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
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authorization for VTSs. That authority first appeared in the 1972
PWSA.95 Under the 1978 Port and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA)96 and 1990
Oil Pollution Act (OPA 1990),"7 the PWSA was amended to expand the
Secretary's authority to construct, operate, maintain, improve, or expand

VTSs in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
including the navigable waters of the United States (now extended to
twelve nautical miles98), or in any area covered by an international
agreement negotiated pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1230. The Coast Guard
now operates ten VTS centers and participates in two others that are
organized and staffed through public-private partnerships." Initially,
participation in some VTSs was voluntary; however, OPA 1990 made

participation mandatory.' °°
The PWSA authority for VTSs is further implemented by

regulations. The Coast Guard substantially revised the VTS regulations
in response to OPA 1990, shortly after the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ
incident. "° In its 1994 VTS rulemaking, the Coast Guard addressed

comments regarding the need for additional VTSs.

In doing so, it

95. PWSA, supra note 80, tit. I, § 101 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1)
(2006)).
96. Port and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA), Pub. L. No. 95-474, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1471, 1472
(Oct. 17, 1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3270.
97.
See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 1990), Pub. L. No. 10 1-380, tit. IV, § 4107(a),
104 Stat. 484, 514 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(2)).
98.
Some U.S. VTSs do indeed extend to the outer limit of the U.S. territorial sea. See,
e.g., 33 C.ER. § 161.55 (2008) (explaining that VTS Puget Sound extends west to U.S. territorial
sea boundary). The IMO VTS Guidelines distinguish between "coastal" VTS and "port or
harbor" VTS, the former of which generally provides only information services. IMO VTS
Guidelines,supm note 10, annex 1,para. 2.1.2.
99. The ten operated by the Coast Guard include VTS Valdez, Puget Sound, San
Francisco, Houston-Galveston, Port Arthur, Lower Mississippi River, Berwick Bay, New York, St.
Mary's River, and Louisville. In addition, it jointly operates VTS centers in Los Angeles-Long
Beach and Tampa, Florida, and to some extent the Lower Mississippi River VTS, in conjunction
with nongovernment entities and operates the Cooperative Puget Sound VTS in conjunction with
Canada. See U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Ctr., Vessel Traffic Services, http://www.navcen.uscg.
gov/mwv/vts/vtshome.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2009); 33 C.F.R. §§ 161.25-.60. Information on
each VTS, including the user guides, is available on the U.S. Coast Guard Homeport Web site,
http://homeport.uscg.mil (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). Private, nongovernmental participants in
cooperative VTSs are never responsible for carrying out inherently governmental functions. 33
U.S.C. § 1223(e). For information on the cooperative public-private VTSs, see MARINE BD.,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC), VESSEL NAvIGATION AND TRAFFIC SERVICES FOR SAFE AND
EFFI IENT PORTS AND WATERwAYS app. D, at 56 (1996).

100. SeeOPA 1990 § 4107.
101. U.S. Coast Guard, Final Rule, National Vessel Traffic Services Regulations (VTS
Final Rules), 59 Fed. Reg. 36,316, 36,316-17 (July 15, 1994). The reorganized regulations are
now divided into subparts on (I)general rules, (2)vessel movement reporting system, and
(3) geographic descriptions and local regulations pertaining to VTS areas, VTS special areas, the
Cooperative VTS area, and reporting points. Related regulations are also contained in 33 C.F.R.
pts. 26, 160, 162, 164, and 165.
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described the criteria used and process followed by the service in making
its resource allocation decisions, while also providing important insights
into the nature and purpose ofa VTS. It began by noting:
Some comments questioned why VTSs are not being established in
other specific waterways. This issue must be addressed in both an
operational and an economic context. Vessel Traffic Services provide the
most active form of vessel traffic management on the waterways.
However, the cost and benefit of such services need to be weighed to
determine if a VTS is the most effective management system or if other
measures are more appropriate for a particular waterway.
Section 4107 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 mandated a study to
determine and prioritize those ports in need of new expanded or improved
VTS systems based on certain risk factors. This study was completed in
August 1991 and is known as the "Port Needs Study" (PNS).... The PNS
provides a cost-benefit analysis wherein the costs of establishing and
operating a VTS in a port or waterway are compared to the potential
benefits of avoided vessel casualties and the consequences of those
casualties. It provides an economic framework necessary to evaluate the
need for new or expanded VTSs in the U.S. Various ports reviewed in the
study are currently under consideration for VTSs. The Coast Guard
intends to establish VTSs and, in a separate rulemaking, make them
in those ports which show a clear benefit from the presence of a
mandatory
02
VTS.'

Consistent with the more general description above, Coast Guard
Vessel Traffic Services (CGVTSs) consist of some combination of vessel
monitoring and communication components, a vessel movement
reporting system,' °3 vessel operation requirements, routing measures, and
Regulations for the various CGVTSs are
trained watchstanders.
promulgated in 33 C.ER. part 161."o Definitions included in those
102. VTS Final Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,317 (33 C.F.R. pts. 1, 26, 160-165); U.S.

COAST

GUARD, PORT NEEDS STUDY (VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES BENEFITS) (1991), DOT-CG-N-01-91,

NTIS DOC. PB 92 107697 (1991). The 1991 Port Needs Study updated a similar study completed
in 1973. SeeKOBURGER, supra note 10, at 23-24 (describing the 1973 Analysis of Port Needs that
examined twenty-two major ports and waterways and concluded that VTSs should be established
in five of those studied).
103. A typical vessel movement reporting system (VMRS) requires covered vessels to
provide the VTS with a sailing plan, periodic position reports, a final report, and notification if
the vessel deviates from its sailing plan. For vessels so equipped, AIS transmissions substitute for
required position reports, lessening the need for, or largely automating the once mostly voice
radio-based process of, the VRMSs. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 161.15-.23.
104. Because these regulations are promulgated under authority of Title I of the PWSA,
any preemption analysis respecting those regulations would be conducted under the second prong
of the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Ray v Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 175, 1978 AMC 527, 544-45 (1978) (holding that a state "may not impose higher safety
standards than those prescribed by the Secretary under Title I" of the PWSA). See also United
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regulations distinguish between vessel movement centers and vessel
traffic centers, the latter of which operate the vessel traffic service for the
VTS area or a sector within a VTS area.' °5
Current internal guidance for CGVTSs is contained in the relevant
volume of the Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual' 6 and the Vessel
Traffic Service National Standard Operating Procedures Manual (VTS
National SOP).0 7 The latter document requires that CGVTS watchstanders
complete an internationally recognized and standardized training
program, including a National VTS Certification Course (aligned with
IALA-recommended VTS training standards' 8 ), along with on-the-job,
supervisor, and professional maritime training components."
The PWSA requires certain designated vessels that operate in a
CGVTS area to utilize and comply with the VTS."' The regulations
apply to "VTS Users" and to other vessels on U.S. navigable waters' and
within the VTS area, to the extent the VTS considers necessary."2
Vessels that fail to comply with any applicable CGVTS requirement or
regulations promulgated under the authority of the PWSA may be denied
entry into U.S. navigable waters." 3 Although the Coast Guard's VTS

States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 107, 2000 AMC 913, 924 (2000) (affirming the continuing validity
of the Ray preemption approach). In promulgating its 1994 comprehensive VTS regulations, the
Coast Guard concluded that those regulations preempted state VTS requirements. See VTS Final
Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,321 (federalism statement).
105. 33 C.ER. § 161.2.
106. 6 MARINE SAFETY MANUAL, supra note 78.
107. VTS NATIONAL SOP, supra note 16.
108. See IALA, supra note 63, ch. 6 (recommending three model courses for VTS
personnel); IMO, JALA Standardsfor Trainingand Certificationof Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
Personnel,MSC Circ. 952 (May 30, 2000) (inviting Member Governments' attention to the IALA
V-103 recommendation). MSC Circular 952 was supplemented by MSC Circular 1065 (Dec. 13,
2002), in which Member Governments were invited to bring IALA model courses to the attention
of their VTS authorities, training institutes, and other concerned parties. See also U.K. Mar. &
Coastguard Agency, Vessel Traffic Services (VTS)--Tainig andCertificalionof VTS Personnel
(2006) (Marine Guidance Note 318), availableathttp://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcgaO7-home/ships
andcargoes/mcga-shipsregsandguidance/marinenotices/mcga-mnotice.htm?textobjid=62A2DC63
579958C5 (adopting and implementing IALA V-103).
109. See IALA, supra note 63, ch. 8. The DHS Inspector General Report recommended
the Coast Guard develop such a National SOP. See DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 3,
at 4.
110. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1223(a)(2), 1232, 1236 (2006); see also 33 C.F.R. § 161.12 ("Subject to
the exigencies of safe navigation, a VTS User shall comply with all measures established or
directions issued by a VTS.").
111. The regulations define "navigable waters" as all navigable waters of the United States
including the territorial sea out to twelve nautical miles. 33 C.F.R. § 161.2(3).
112. Id.
§ 161.3.
113. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1228(a)(4), 1232(c); 33 C.F.R. § 160.107.
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regulations make provision for deviations from those regulations, "4
nothing in the CGVTS regime relieves vessel owners, masters, or
embarked pilots of their responsibility for safe navigation."' Moreover,
the Coast Guard's VTS regulations make it clear that the regulations do
not lessen the mariner's obligation to comply with the applicable rules of
the road."' On occasion, however, the VTS regulations may impose
limits on a vessel's maneuvering and collision avoidance options. For
example, the regulations may require prior VTS approval before a vessel
in the system meets, crosses, or overtakes another vessel in the system."7
D.

The Master-PilotRelationship

VTSs operate in waters where federal or state law requires most
commercial vessels to employ a local pilot;"8 therefore, any adjustment
to the vessel-VTS relationship must be mindful of the closely related
vessel-pilot relationship."9 Pilotage services vary from port to port, and
even within particular ports. The titles "bar pilot," "river pilot" "harbor
pilot" and "docking pilot" suggest the range of possible services.' °
Pilotage is both a marine professional service and a regulatory
requirement and does not fit neatly into either the internal or external risk
management category. To the extent that pilotage is, like escort tug
services in some waters, 2 ' imposed upon vessels by regulation, and

114. 33 C.ER. §§ 161.5, .12(b). Even where a law expressly sanctions a departure from
the ordinary rules, in the interest of safety, courts may narrowly construe the authority to depart.
See Crowley Marine Servs. Inc. v. Maritrans Inc., 447 E3d 719, 727, 2006 AMC 1246, 1253 (9th
Cir. 2006) (construing COLREGS Rule 2(b)--the so-called "rule of special circumstances"--and
limiting any departure from the rules for special circumstances to cases where the departure is
"necessary to avoid immediate danger" and thus excluding departure by agreement); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965) (stating that violation of a statute may be
excused, and therefore does not constitute negligence, when, inter alia, compliance would involve
a greater risk of harm to the actors or to others or the actor is confronted by an emergency not of
the actor's own misconduct).
115. 33 C.ER. § 161.1(c). Similar admonitions are set out in COLREGS Rule 2(a). By
making it clear that the mariner's obligations extend beyond the rules of the road and in some
cases may even require a departure from the rules, Rule 2 is viewed by some as the linchpin of the
current ship-centric paradigm.
116. See id § 161.1(d).
117. Id. § 161.13(3). This courtesy facilitates radar tracking of converging vessels within
the system.
118. See46 U.S.C. §§ 8501-8503 (2006) (federal and state pilotage).
119. See NTSB REPORT, supra note 4, at 95-96 ("Responsibilities of the Master and the
Pilot"); see also MARINE BD., supra note 26, at 333-34 (setting out four VTS-specific recommendations).
120. Not considered here are "deep-sea pilots" who operate in certain offshore waters.
121. See33 C.ER. pt. 168.
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embarked pilots do not become a member of the vessel's crew, ' pilotage
may be viewed as an external measure. Innovations by some ports
permitting, under limited circumstances, vessels to be piloted by licensed
pilots located on shore fall more closely in the category of external risk
management measures. ' However, from the VTS perspective, viewing
pilotage as an external risk management measure suggests a certain
dichotomy in the nature of control on board the vessel that can be
dangerously misleading. One of the hazards of that point of view-that
the pilot and vessel master and crew are two distinct entities-was
intimated in the COSCO BUSAN incident, when communications by the
VTS directed to the pilot (rather than to the vessel by name) might not
have been understood, or
its importance not appreciated, by the vessel's
24
officer.
watch
or
master
Early federal decisions, including several by the United States
Supreme Court, described an embarked pilot as the "temporary master"
of the piloted vessel and set strict limits on the master's power to override
the pilot's decisions.'2 Those early cases have been superseded in part by
U.S. ratification of the STCW Convention and Code. The relevance of
international standards for watchkeeping now codified in the STCW
Code was highlighted in the M/V SUMMIT VENTURE-bridge allision
case, where the court condemned the vessel owner's failure to instruct the
master and crew on their continuing responsibility for navigation despite
1

122. The American Pilots' Association generally agrees that navigation safety is a shared
responsibility but at the same time rejects the suggestion that an embarked pilot becomes a
member of the vessel's "bridge team." See Am. Pilots' Ass'n, Pilotage in the United States: Role
of the Pilot, http://www.americanpilots.org/PilotagelnUS.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). By
contrast, the NTSB has repeatedly stressed the importance of pilots undergoing training in bridge
resource management. See, e.g., NTSB, Marine Accident Brief, DCA-06-MF-013, NTSB

Recommendation M-07-3 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2007/MAB
0702.pdf (grounding of Hong Kong-registered container ship NEW DELHI EXPRESS on April

15, 2006).
123. Rotterdam is one the best-known ports permitting remote pilotage. See Shore Based
Pilotage, Port of Rotterdam, The Netherlands, Area Procedures, RTM 9 (May 15, 2000), available

at http://www.worldvtsguide.org/Ports/Netherlands/Rotterdam%208/RTM9.pdf. Other locations
selectively permitting remote pilotage include Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and Malta. See
Karl Bruno & Margareta Liitzh6ft, Shore-Based Pilotage: Pilot or Autopilot? Piloting as a

Control Problem, 62 J. NAY. 427, 427-28 (2009); Patrick van Erve, Can the Shipping-Aviation
Analogy Be Usedas an Argument To Decreasethe Need for Mantime Pilotage 59 J. NA. 359
(2006) (discussing pilotage in European ports); see also MARINE BD., supra note 26, at 186
(discussing shore-based pilotage).
124. The NTSB recommended that Coast Guard VTSs communicate with covered vessels
by vessel name, rather than only by the embarked pilot's identifying call letter or number. See
NTSB REPORT, supranote 4, at 137 (NTSB Recommendation M-09-2).
125. See ALEX L. PARKs & EDWARD V CAT-rELL, JR., THE LAW OF TUG, Tow, AND PILOTAGE
1003-10 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing cases).
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the presence of a pilot.'26 Recognizing that a layered safety management
approach entails shared navigation responsibility, the STCW Code
established the following rules:
49. Despite the duties and obligations of pilots, their presence on board
does not relieve the master or officer in charge of the navigational
watch from their duties and obligations for the safety of the ship. The
master and the pilot shall exchange information regarding navigation
procedures, local conditions and the ship's characteristics. The
master and/or the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall cooperate closely with the pilot and maintain an accurate check on the
ship's position and movement.
50. If in any doubt as to the pilot's actions or intentions, the officer in
charge of the navigational watch shall seek clarification from the
pilot and, if doubt still exists, shall notify the master immediately and
take whatever action is necessary before the master arrives.'
A 2003 resolution by the IMO Assembly reaffirmed these
principles and added that "[m]asters and bridge officers have a duty to
support the pilot and to ensure that his/her actions are monitored at all
times.' 18 The intent behind the rule is to take advantage, to a greater

extent, of the risk management "layers" available on board the vessel by
providing clear, ongoing responsibilities for the master and crew.
Prudent shipowners should demand nothing less. Shipowners and
operators who dispatch their vessels to ports throughout the world know
full well that pilot competency varies from one location to another. 9
They also know that vessel navigation and collision avoidance equipment
vary by manufacturer and even model, particularly with regard to the
location of equipment controls and their displays. Finally, shipowners
know that no one is more familiar with the ship's equipment and
operational procedures than the master and crew (certainly not pilots,
who in some ports compensate for their lack of familiarity by bringing

126. Inje Hercules Carriers, 566 E Supp. 962, 982, 1983 AMC 2409, 2436-37 (M.D. Fla.
1983) (denying shipowner's petition to limit liability after finding that the owner failed to
adequately train the vessel's master and crew in their responsibilities when a harbor pilot was
employed, a relationship defined at the time by a precursor to the STCW Code), affT, 768 F2d
1558 (1
lth Cir. 1985).
127. STCW Code, supra note 66, § A-VIII/2, pt. 3-1, paras. 49-50.
128. IMO, Recommendations on Train'ng and Certification and on Operational
Proceduresfor Martime Pilots otherthan Deep-Sea Pilot, IMO Res. A.960(23) (Dec. 5, 2003),
annex 2, para. 2.3.
129. See JoHNi MCPHEE, LOOKING FOR A SHIP 222 (1990) (suggesting the ship's master
could "see a courtroom full of lawyers" reflected in a nonchalant and inexperienced pilot's eyes).
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aboard a specially equipped laptop computer, sometimes referred to as a
130
"personal piloting unit" or
The pilot is selected and employed because of his or her knowledge
of the pilotage waters (including any VTS operating in those waters), not
of the vessel, its equipment, or crew. The modem navigation safety
regime recognizes that if the ship is to be navigated with precautions
appropriate to the prevailing circumstances, the master and crew must be
fully integrated into, and engaged in, vessel navigation and collision
avoidance at all times, even while a pilot is aboard. The prudent
shipowner will therefore prescribe a policy requiring a thorough masterpilot exchange of information, during which the master provides the pilot
with, among other things, information on the vessel's maneuvering
characteristics, and the pilot and master agree on the vessel's "passage"
plan.'3 ' Any differences between the voyage plan, prepared by the master
in accordance with SOLAS and the STCW Code, and the pilot's intended
passage plan must be reconciled. The master-pilot information exchange
is designed to facilitate a shared understanding of the risk factors and risk
management considerations pertinent to the vessel's passage.
It would be disingenuous to suggest that actual practices on the
water completely or even mostly conform to the legal standards. The sad
truth is that the actual master-pilot relationship too often looks quite
different from the STCW vision, and the notion of the decisive,
semiautonomous master, exercising peremptory command over the
130. In Puget Sound, for example, roughly twenty percent of the pilots use portable
personal piloting unit (PPU) laptops. Delmar Mackenzie, After Cosco Busan: A FreshLook at
Safety in Puget Soung PAC. MAR. MAG., Aug. 2008, at 32. Proposed federal and state legislation
would put additional pressure on the remaining pilots to carry PPUs. See, e.g., H.R. 1100, 111 th
Cong. (2009) (Vessel Navigation and Safety Improvement Act) (permitting the Coast Guard to
require pilots operating under the authority of their federal license to carry "portable electronic
navigation devices"); S. 300, 2009 Sen. (Cal. 2009) (imposing similar requirements on pilots
operating under authority of their California-issued pilot's license). A pilot using a PPU will
almost certainly relate to the vessel's bridge team and bridge equipment differently than a pilot
not so equipped, perhaps widening the gap between them.
131. See IMO Res. A.960(23), supra note 128, annex 2, para. 5 (describing elements of the
master-pilot exchange). The resolution distinguishes between "passage" planning as part of the
master-pilot exchange, and the independent requirement for berth-to-berth "voyage planning"
under SOLAS Regulation V/34, STCW Code, section A-VIII/2, part 2, and IMO Resolution
A.893(21) (Nov. 25, 1999). IMO Res. A.960(23), supam note 128, annex 2, para. 5.6. Resolution
A.960(23) describes the master-pilot "passage plan" as "a basic indication of preferred intention"
regarding the vessel's passage through the pilotage area, and goes on to explain that "both the
pilot and the master should be prepared to depart from it when circumstances so dictate." Id
para. 5.5. Maritime Administrations, such as the U.K. Marine Accident Investigation Branch, and
the NTSB now carefully scrutinize the master-pilot exchange in the course of marine casualty
investigations. SeeNTSB REPORT, supm note 4, at 133, 137-38 (Recommendation M-09-8); THE
NAUTiCAL INSTITUTE ON PILOTAGE AND SHIPHANDLING, supra note 38, at 11-13; THE NAUTICAL
INSTITUTE ON COMMAND: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 33-39, 114-17, 142-47, 189-93 (2d ed. 2000).
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vessel, may be a relic. Shipowners, charterers, and operators are
increasingly involved in day to day administrative and operational
decisions involving their vessels, and masters are more likely to be found
answering the owner's emails or satellite phone calls than studying the
ARPA user's manual or poring over the second mate's voyage plan for the
upcoming transit. Too many masters behave as though the pilot is
responsible for, and in control of, the vessel's navigation as soon as the
"Hotel" flag goes up. However, the fact that we have not yet achieved the
competent and diligent bridge team vision set out by the STCW Code
does not suggest the vision is wrong. Rather, it should serve as a
reminder that effective implementation of a policy is nearly always more
difficult than making the policy decision.
The evolving relationship between vessel masters and embarked
pilots, along with such innovations as remote, shore-based pilotage,
provides important lessons for those engaged in similar decisions
regarding the relationship between vessels (and their pilots) and VTSs.
Pilots have a vital stake in any decision to reallocate responsibility for the
control of vessel movements. While they cannot control the direction or
magnitude of any change, as professionals who provide the critical link
between the bridge of the ship and the port community, pilots can
certainly influence the decision makers.
III. TiH VTS CONTROL DEBATE
Arguments for expanding shoreside monitoring and control of
vessels are neither unexpected nor irrational.'32 For some, the air traffic
control model and shore-based pilotage innovations demonstrate the
feasibility of shoreside control. Control advocates point out that the
capacity to monitor vessel positions and movements accurately has been
vastly expanded by the introduction of differential GPS and AIS
transponders, '" which have the combined capability to transmit, among
other information, the vessel's identity, GPS position, course, and

132. See, for example, the papers presented at the Tulane Law School Admiralty Law
Institute's conference on "Admiralty Law at the Millennium' including Joseph C. Sweeney,
Collision Law in the Next Millennium, 73 TuL. L. REV. 1803, 1804 (1999) (spinning a 2025
scenario in which the featured "vessel's open ocean navigation is under the direction of the IMO's
International Safety Enforcement Directorate (ISED) which controls the mandated multi-lane
highways for vessels crossing the Atlantic Ocean in either direction"), and PanelDiscussion of
Collision, Towage, Salvage, andLimitation ofLiability,Mamrh 18, 1999, 24 TuL. MAR. L.J. 405
(1999).
133. See sources cited supranote 9.
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speed."' Such improvements in shoreside capability, argue some, move
the vessel traffic operating picture ever closer to the air traffic model. In
his widely quoted 1999 address to the Trinity House (London) referred to
earlier, former IMO Secretary-General William O'Neil--one of the
world's most respected maritime authorities-commented to an audience
of master mariners and pilots:
Despite all the qualifications and restrictions, the trend is
unmistakable.
It is towards more and more shore-based control.
Comparisons are frequently made between shipping and aviation and
although the two forms of transport are very different, the idea of aircraft
operating without being subject to control from the ground is somewhat
terrifying. When it is recognized that all forms of transportation except
ships are controlled remote from the vehicle, it is hard to sustain any valid
argument that vessels should continue to be exempted.
In addition, when we consider that high-speed ships carrying several
hundred people at speeds upwards of 50 [miles] an hour are becoming
more commonplace on many of our short-sea routes, the very routes where
congestion and the risk of collision are greatest, can we afford to hide
behind "tradition"? What will happen when the appetite for higher speeds
moves more and more into other segments of the merchant fleet? "
Because he brushes broadly, it is easy to find fault with Mr. O'Neil's
criticism of those who believe vessels should not be subject to the kind of
remote, ground-based control common to aircraft. One might begin, for
example, by challenging his assertion of an "unmistakable" trend towards
shore-based control'36 and his reliance on the aviation analogy to support
the conclusion; an analogy thoroughly examined (and largely rejected) by
both the NRC's Marine Board in 19941" and the Swedish Maritime
Authority in 2006138 (this second issue is addressed inr Part III.B of this
Article). On the other hand, the mere fact that the comparison between
the air traffic control model and shore-based pilotage might be a poor
analogy does not in itself mean that greater shoreside control over vessel

134. See IMO, Adoption ofAmendments to the InternationalConvention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended IMO Res. MSC.99(73) (Dec. 5, 2000) (adding, among other
changes, Reg. V/19/2.4 to the SOLAS Convention); seealso33 C.ER. § 164.46 (2008).
135. O'Neil, supm note 11.
136. There does appear to be a trend toward a geographic expansion of vessel traffic
management services seaward beyond ports and the territorial sea. See David Patraiko,
Ship/Shore CoastalRelationships, SEAWAYS, June 2009, at 5-7. But evidence of an "unmistakable" trend toward greater shore-based control of vessels (in contrast to providing more
information) is lacking.
137. SeeMARINEBD., supranote 26, ch. 5.
138. See Bruno & Liitzh6ft, supm note 123, at 435. The author is not aware of an English
language translation of the report.
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movements is a bad idea. Nor does a belief that issuing mandatory
directions to vessels should not be a common practice mean that such
directions should not be used as a "layer of last resort" when the other
layers prove inadequate. In order to evaluate these arguments and others,
a more comprehensive examination is needed.
A.

More Than Tradition: The PresentVTS ControlRegime

More than tradition underlies the present vessel control regime. The
international and U.S. authorities discussed above not only authorize
establishment and operation of VTSs in selected waterways, but to
varying degrees they also allocate the respective responsibilities for
vessel direction and control among the ship-based and shore-based actors.
Although both lines of authority address VTS "directions" to vessels,'
they repose ultimate responsibility for the vessel's navigation in the
master, thus conditioning their use of the term "control" when they refer
to VTS interventions.
1.

International Guidance on VTS "Instructions"

The purported trend "towards more and more shore-based control"
adverted to by Mr. O'Neil is not reflected in current international
guidance on VTS. For example, the IMO Guidelines, updated just two
years before Mr. O'Neil's speech and still in force, urge national
authorities to take the following into account when issuing VTS
"instructions":
When the VTS is authorized to issue instructions to vessels, these
instructions should be result-oriented only, leaving the details of execution,
such as course to be steered or engine manoeuvres to be executed, to the
master or pilot on board the vessel. Care should be taken that VTS
operations do not encroach upon the master's responsibility for safe
navigation,
or disturb the traditional relationship between master and
140
pilot.

Four points made or implied by the guidelines should be noted. First, the
Guidelines acknowledge that not all VTSs are even authorized to issue
"instructions" (in contrast to information, advice, or warnings) to vessels.
Second, although the IMO's use of "instruction" closely parallels the
139. In this Article, "directions" refer to VTS actions that go beyond the role of monitoring
and providing information, advice, or recommendations (where compliance is not required).
Rather, a VTS "direction" refers to an order to a vessel to take, not take, or cease taking a
particular action. See KOBURGER, supra note 10, at 25-26.
140. IMO VTS Guidelines; supra note 10, annex 1,para. 2.3.4.
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PWSA's use of the term "direction," the word "control" is not used in the
IMO Guidelines. Third, the IMO Guidelines include a nonencroachment
norm that affirms that "[d]ecisions concerning the actual navigation and
manoeuvering of the vessel remain with the master."'' Neither a VTS
sailing plan (the term used in the IMO Guidelines and Coast Guard
VMRS regulations. 2) nor "requested or agreed changes to the sailing
plan can supersede the decisions of the master concerning the actual
navigation and manoeuvering of the vessel.""'3 Finally, even when
"instructions" are authorized, they should be composed in phrases taken
from the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCPs).'"
They should also be "result-oriented.""' 5 The Guidelines then go on to
recommend that any VTS message directed to a vessel should include
"message markers" that make it clear whether the message contains
information, advice, a warning, or an instruction.'46
Relying in part on the IMO's guidance, the U.K. Marine Accident
Investigation Branch (MAIB) recently rejected a call for more direct
VTS control over vessel movements. In its report on the 2002 collision
between the DIAMANT and the NORTHERN MERCHANT-three
years after Mr. O'Neil described an "unmistakable" trend-the MAIB
concluded:
In the case of all types of VTS, giving execution details, such as specific
helm and engine orders, is unacceptable, because they could be
inappropriate, given the limited knowledge of the prevailing circumstances
and the particulars of the vessels involved, and could result in legal action
against the VTS.1
The current U.K. approach is summed up in Marine Guidance Note 401,
which states--consistent with the IMO Guidelines-that "[w]hen a VTS
is authorised to provide NAS to vessels, communication should be resultoriented; leaving the details of execution, such as course to be steered or

141. Id.para. 2.6.2 (reinforcing the admonition by reaffirming that the decision remains
with the master).
142. See33C.ER.§ 161.19(2008).
143. IMO VTS Guidelines; supm note 10, annex 1, para. 2.6.2.
144. IMO, StandardMarine CommunicationPhrases(SMCP), WO Res. A.918(22) (Nov.
29,2001) [hereinafter SMCP].
145. IMO VTS Guidelines, supmrnote 10, annex 1, paras. 2.3.4, 2.4.1.
146. Id.
para. 2.4.2.
147. U.K. MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF
THE COLLISION BETWEEN DIAMANT/NORTHERN MERCHANT 3 MILES SE OF DOVER ON 6
JANUARY 2002, MERCHANT REPoRT No. 10/2003, at 43 (2003), available at http://www.maib.gov.
uk/cmsresources/diamant-northem-merchant.pdf [hereinafter U.K. MAIB REPORT].
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engine 4maneuvers
to be executed, to the master or pilot on board the
8
vessel. '
2.

Current U.S. Statutory Authorization for VTS Directions

In examining Coast Guard directions to vessels, it is important to
distinguish between vessel-specific safety orders and more general areaor activity-based measures.' 9 The PWSA authorizes both, but authority
to issue such orders has been selectively delegated. The COSCO
BUSAN incident raised questions regarding both types of orders:
(1) should the Coast Guard restrict or even forbid vessel movements in
the harbor when restricted visibility renders such navigation unsafe (a
general measure), and (2) should the Coast Guard have ordered the
COSCO BUSAN to change course, stop, or anchor to avoid an allision
with the bridge (a vessel-specific direction or order)? This Article
focuses on the latter type of order.
Within the United States, authority to control vessel movements is
authorized by the PWSA, as amended. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(b) provides the
Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating with
authority to "order" a vessel to "operate" in a "manner" the Secretary
"directs" in any of three circumstances. The first circumstance arises
when the Secretary has reasonable cause to believe the vessel does not
comply with any regulation issued under the PWSA (such as the
navigation safety regulations or the VTS regulations) or any other
applicable law or treaty (such as the international or inland rules of the
road).'5° The second circumstance, which is not relevant here, occurs
when the Secretary determines that the vessel does not satisfy the
conditions of port entry.'5 ' The third and most relevant circumstance
arises when, "by reason of weather, visibility, sea conditions, port
congestion, other hazardous circumstances, or the condition of such
vessel, he is satisfied that such directive is justified in the interest of
safety."'5 2 It bears repeating that not all of the vessel control authority
148. U.K. Mar. & Coastguard Agency, Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and Local Port
Services (LPS) in the United Kingdom, Marine Guidance Note 401 (M & F), para. 7.7.6,
availableathttp://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mgn4Ol.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,2009).
149. A distinction is also drawn between directions to avoid collision or other marine
casualty and directions to cease a violation of applicable rules or regulations, such as the
prohibition on anchoring in a TSS. See VTS NATIONAL SOP, supra note 16, para. 2.C.4, at 2-3;
1MO VTS Guidelines,supm note 10, annex 1,para. 2.4.2.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(b)(1) (2006); see also 33 C.ER. § 160.113(b) (2008) (authorizing
orders prohibiting a vessel from operating on the navigable waters of the U.S. under similar
conditions).
151. See33U.S.C.§ 1228.
152. Id § 1223(b)(3).
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provided by the PWSA has been delegated to the Coast Guard VTSs.
Most of that authority is lodged in the relevant Coast Guard sector
commander, in his or her capacity as the captain of the port. Thus close
attention to the "delegations" set out by statute and regulation is always
necessary.
3.

Current U.S. Regulatory Framework for VTS Directions

The Coast Guard carefully examined VTS direction and control
issues in the course of its post-EXXON VALDEZ grounding
rulemaking.' 3 When it issued final rules on July 15, 1994, the Coast
Guard expressly addressed "vessel control" and noted that the issue
garnered the most comments in the course of its rulemaking. 54 In
promulgating the final rule, the Coast Guard reported that the new rule
"does not change the Coast Guard's authority or policy on vessel traffic
management."' 55 The rule did, however, include two delegations of vessel
control authority: the first applicable to captains of the port and the
second to VTSs. 56' In doing so, the Coast Guard explained that "[t]hese
provisions define the relationship between the VTS and the Captain of
the Port, and also assure that, when necessary, a VTS has the legal
authority to establish VTS measures and vessel operating requirements to
enhance vessel traffic management."' 7
The current Vessel Traffic Management regulations delegate to
CGVTSs the authority to provide "services"'5 8 and to impose "measures
or directions"'5 9 and "operating requirements."'" In addition, CGVTSs
are charged with administering the vessel movement reporting system if

153. See U.S. Coast Guard, Final Rule, National Vessel Traffic Services Regulations (VTS
Final Rules), 59 Fed. Reg. 36,316, 36,316-17 (July 15, 1994) (33 C.ER. pts. 1, 26, 160-165). At
roughly the same time, the Coast Guard was preparing a report summarizing its study on whether
there was a need for additional authority, as required by Congress in OPA 1990. See Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA 1990), Pub. L. No. 101-380, tit. IW,§ 4107(a), 104 Stat. 484, 514 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(2)).
154. VTS Final Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,316.
155. Id.
156. The new delegations were codified in 33 C.ER. §§ 1.01-30 and 160.5.
157. VTS Final Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,317. The relationship between the captain of the
port and the VTS was later changed with the advent of the Coast Guard "sector" organization.
See hfia note 167 and accompanying text.
158. 33 C.ER. § 161.10; see also VTS NATONAL SOP, supm note 16, para. 2.B, at 2-1 to 22. VTS "services" include information services (INS), navigation assistance services (NAS) and
traffic organization services rTOS). NAS include providing information, recommendations, and
paras. 2.B.2.b, at 2-2, 3.B.4, at 3-2.
warnings. Id.
159. 33 C.ER. § 161.11(a).
160. Id. § 161.12.
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such systems are in place in the VTS area.'6 ' As described earlier, the
amended PWSA authorizes the Secretary to "order" a vessel to "operate"
in a "manner" the Secretary "directs" under the circumstances specified
in the Act.' 2 The Coast Guard's implementing regulations somewhat
confusingly mix several verbs and nouns to describe the more active VTS
63
activities, including "measures," "directions," "control," and "orders"'
(but not "recommendations").'" In prescribing the CGVTS authority to
issue "measures or directions, the regulations recognize that "[u]nder
certain circumstances, a VTS may issue directions to control the
movement of vessels in order to minimize the risk of collision between
vessels, or damage to property or the environment."'"
The authority for a CGVTS to issue measures or directions
(including the apparently redundant "directions to control") in the Vessel
Traffic Management regulations (33 C.ER. part 161) must be read in
conjunction with the "delegations" section of the general Ports and
Waterways Safety Regulations in 33 C.ER. part 160. Under the latter
67
regulations, VTS commanding officers (now called VTS directors)'6 8
have been delegated broad authority over vessels operating in the VTS.'
That authority, which "may be exercised by Vessel Traffic Center
personnel," "69subject to the supervision of the sector and district
commander,' includes the authority to,
within the Vessel Traffic Service area, provide information, make
recommendations, or, to a vessel required under Part 161 of this chapter to
participate in a Vessel Traffic Service, issue an order includingan order to
operate or anchor as directed, require the vessel to comply with orders
161.

Seeid.§ 161.15.

162. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(b) (2006).
163. One could add "operational requirement" and the IMO term "instruction." The term
"order" is also associated with an exercise of the captain of the port authority under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1223(b)and 33 C.F.R. § 160.111.
164. New rulemaking that included definitions of the various VTS actions and aligned
those terms and definitions with IMO-IALA terminology would promote uniformity and reduce
confusion.
165. 33 C.FR. § 161.11(a). 33 C.FR. § 161.11(b) authorizes the VTS, in times of
congestion, restricted visibility, adverse weather, or other hazardous circumstances, to "control,
supervise, or otherwise manage traffic, by specifying times of entry, movement or departure to,
from, or within a VTS area."
166. Id. § 161.1(b).
167. With the advent of the Coast Guard "sector" organization initiative, VTSs are now a
component of the sector. As a result, VTSs are no longer commanded by a VTS commanding
officer, but rather supervised by a "VTS director" who is under the command of the sector
commander. SeeVTS NATIONAL SOP, supranote 16, para. 1.D.3, at 1-1.
168. 33 C.ER. § 160.5(d).
169. Id.

170. Id.
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issued; specify times of entry, movement or departure; restrict operations as
necessary for safe operation under the circumstances; or take other action
necessary for control of the vessel and the safety of the port or of the
marine environment.'7'
VTS users are required to "comply with all measures established or
directions issued by a VTS."' 72 At the same time, however, the
regulations provide what might be deemed a safe harbor provision:
The owner, operator, charterer, master, or person directing the movement of
a vessel remains at all times responsible for the manner in which the vessel
is operated and maneuvered, and is responsible for the safe navigation of
the vessel under all circumstances. Compliance w4th these rules or with a
direction of the VTS is at all times contingent upon the exigencies of safe
navigation.'73

The authority conferred by the PWSA, as fleshed out and further
delegated by regulations promulgated by the Secretary, is further
controlled by Coast Guard internal directives and guidance documents.
The Coast Guard, in response to findings and recommendations by the
DHS Inspector General and NTSB following the COSCO BUSAN
incident, has focused its attention on these policy and procedure
directives.
4.

Current Coast Guard Policy on VTS Directions

In implementing the authority delegated by the amended PWSA
through the agency's regulations, the Coast Guard VTS National SOP's
"Concept of Operations" section recognizes four VTS management
activities: monitoring, informing, recommending, and directing.
It
will be noted that the terminology differs somewhat from that used in the
IMO Guidelines and the IMO Standard Marine Communication
Phrases.'75 The Coast Guard's VTS National SOP emphasizes that these
171. Id.(emphasis added).
172. 33 C.ER. § 161.12(a) (emphasis added); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(2) (2006).
173. 33 C.FR. § 161.1(c) (emphasis added). No mention is made of "measures" or
"orders." Section 161.1(d) adds:
Nothing in this part is intended to relieve any vessel, owner, operator, charterer, master,
or person directing the movement of a vessel from the consequences of any neglect to
comply with this part or any other applicable law or regulation (e.g., the International
Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS) or the Inland
Navigation Rules) or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the
ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.
174. SeeVTS NATIONAL SOP, supm note 16, para. 2.C, at 2-2.
175. The MO VTS Guidelines and SMCPs add the phrase "warning" and use the term
"instruction" instead of "direction." See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
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four terms-often described as establishing a "continuum of vessel
traffic management" framework-encompass the entire range of VTS
management activities. "6 Although the four activities are listed in order
of increasing VTS control, the SOP makes it clear that the actions may be
implemented in any order.'77 For example, if while monitoring a vessel
the CGVTS operator or supervisor observes a hazardous situation (for
example, a vessel straying into the oncoming traffic lane), the VTS might
issue a direction to the vessel without first informing or warning the
vessel or making a recommendation (though in most cases a timely
warning would accomplish the same goal).
The VTS National SOP distinguishes "directions to control the
movement of vessels" from other forms of directions, including
directions that designate temporary reporting points or procedures,
establish traffic routing schemes, enforce exclusion areas or speed
restrictions, or relay captain of the port orders.' 8 Consistent with the
IMO VTS Guidelines, the SOP also admonishes that "VTS should not
normally direct a course to be steered or engine orders to be executed,"' 79
but rather "[d]irections to vessels are normally given in the form of a
desired outcome."'' ° At the same time, it directs that "VTS Internal
Operating Procedures (1OP) [promulgated by sector commanders and/or
VTS directors responsible for the various VTSs] will provide detailed
procedures for employment of VTS direction."' 8 Standard terminology
for VTS directions will also be developed and included in the internal
SOPs.'82
Although the VTS National SOP was promulgated in 2009, after
the COSCO BUSAN allision, the continuum of the traffic management
measures concept was formulated earlier. The VTS San Francisco User's
Manual explains the steps in the "continuum" concept of operations this
way:

176.

VTS NATIONAL SOP, supranote 16, para.2.C, at 2-2.

177. Id."Control" over vessels-the fourth level in the continuum-is common in one
Coast Guard VTS: Berwick Bay (near Morgan City, Louisiana), where the nature of the
waterway and its associated bridges has led to the VTS directly controlling the movement of the

4000 or so vessels that transit the VTS area each month. Kathryn Lulaga, VTS Berwick Bay,
COAST GUARD J. OF SAFETY & SECURITY AT SEA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARINE SAFETY &
SECURITY COUNCIL, Summer 2007, at 12.
178. VTS NATIONAL SOP, supra note 16, para. 2.C.4, at 2-3; see also id para. 3.B.3, at 3-2
("Control of Vessel Traffic").
179. Id.para. 2.B.2.d, at 2-2.
180. Id.para. 2.C.4, at 2-3.
181. Id; seealsoid.para. 3.B.l, at3-1.
182. Id.para. 3.B.3.b, at 3-2.
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The primary function of VTS San Francisco is to facilitate good order and
predictability on a waterway by coordinating vessel movements through the
collection, verification, organization, and dissemination of information. To
accomplish this, VTS San Francisco uses the concept of a "continuum of
traffic management". This continuum consists of the following levels of
control: Monitor, Inform, Recommend, and Direct.
(1) Monitor Using AIS, radar, CCTV,and radiotelephone equipment,
VTS monitors vessel traffic in the VTS Area. VTS also receives
information from various sources on predicted vessel movements,
hazards to navigation, aids to navigation discrepancies, and other
information of interest to VTS users. Monitoring vessel traffic allows
us to ensure that vessels are navigating safely and efficiently in
accordance with applicable regulations and Navigation rules.
(2) Inforn VTS analyses the information gathered then informs
participants as applicable. This is done at the user's request, when it
appears necessary to VTS personnel, or at regular intervals. The
purpose of informing participants is to give them timely information
to allow them to make decisions concerning the navigation of their
vessels.
(3) Recommend Almost all of VTS San Francisco operations are
conducted at the monitor and inform levels. However, at certain
times the VTS will recommend action be taken by a participant to
prevent a potentially dangerous situation. Such recommendations are
offered to assist the participant in avoiding hazardous situations early
on. Recommendations are made on the pretence [presumption?] that
there is information available to VTS of which the participant may
not be aware.
(4) Direct On rare occasions (and during heightened security
conditions) VTS will direct movement or actions of a participant.
Direction would be given in cases when the VTC observes obvious
violations of regulations or an obvious and immediately dangerous
condition of which the participant is not or does not seem to be
aware. Directions will normally be in the form ofa general objective
such as staying out of a certain area 8or
3 coming no closer than a
certain distance from a vessel or facility.
It goes on to remind VTS users:
The ultimate responsibility for safe navigation of a vessel remains
with the master or person in charge. Each of these actions, monitor,
inform, recommend and direct are independent of each other and one
183. U.S. COAST GUARD, VTS SAN FRANCISCO, USER'S MANUAL 2 (2005), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/dl 1/vtssf/vtssfum.asp (emphasis added) [hereinafter VTS SAN FRANCISCO,
USER'S MANUAL]. As noted above, the VTS National SOP states that "[d]irections to vessels are
normally given in the form of a desired outcome." VTS NATIONAL SOP, supm note 16, para.
2.C.4, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
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action does not necessarily proceed the other. For instance, VTS may not
issue a recommendation prior to issuing a direction. When performing the
functions discussed here, VTS is not relieving the master or person in
charge of his or her responsibility to control vessel movement. At no time
is that person relieved by the VTC of responsibilities assigned by the
applicable Navigation Rules and other pertinent laws or regulations.8 4
B.

CriteriaandProceduresApplicable to VTSPolicy Decisions

Before turning to an evaluation of whether the statutes, regulations,
or Coast Guard policies on VTS directions should be changed, it may be
helpful to describe the policy analysis framework appropriate for such an
inquiry. A typical approach to policy analysis proceeds in five steps:
(1) defining the problem, 185 (2) establishing evaluation criteria, 8'
(3) identifying alternative policies, (4) displaying the alternatives and
selecting among them, and (5) monitoring and evaluating the policy
decision's outcomes. Policy implementation takes place after step 4 and
overlaps with step 5 .

Policy analysis and decision making must be seen

not as the search for the "solution," but rather as an ongoing and iterative
process.
In a society that values stakeholder participation and
transparency, analysts must be mindful of process requirements and
expectations. Thus requirements for notice and an opportunity to be
heard or to comment, and the role of advisory committees and
interagency partners, must be respected. It is also important to bear in
mind that any decision must be effectively announced to those affected
by it, and success of the new policy will require careful attention to
implementation, training, and periodic reassessment and adjustments.
Finally, the question whether a change should be made must be
distinguished from the question regarding the level at which such a
change is best implemented. Some changes must or should be made at
the legislative level, while others call for the greater flexibility and
responsiveness afforded through implementing regulations or agency
directives to its personnel.
184. VTS SAN FRANCIsCO, USER'S MANUAL, supm note 183, at 2.
185. The problem statement identifies the difference between the present state and the
desired state. A common error in the problem definition step lies in the inability or reluctance to
see the problem from each of the relevant viewpoints. See JAMES L. ADAMS, CONCEPTUAL
BLOCKBUSTING 33-34 (4th ed. 2001).
186. The goal of public policy is commonly expressed as the maximization of net social
welfare, calculated through a comparison of costs and benefits. Alternative courses are typically
compared on the basis of their relative effectiveness in achieving comparable results. Cost
considerations include not only the magnitude of the costs of the alternatives under consideration
but also who will bear those costs.
187.

SeegenerallyWEMER&VINING, supranote 28, ch. 11.
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As with any discussion of policy decisions by agencies charged
with implementing statutes or treaties, the agency must comply with the
text of the enabling statute or treaty (self-executing treaty issues aside).
Additionally, the agency's policy choices should be informed by any
statement of policy announced in the statute or treaty. For example, the
amended PWSA specifies Congress' policy objectives in enacting the
legislation. The importance of adhering to the statutory considerations
and procedures was recently emphasized by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Defenders of Wildlife v
Gutierrez in the context of a challenge to the process of designating
offshore vessel routing measures.
The PWSA policy objectives are now codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1221,
and include, for example, a statement that "increased supervision of
vessel and port operations is necessary" for reasons set out in the Act."9
In addition, any policy choices must be guided by 33 U.S.C. § 1224,
which sets out nine nonexclusive factors the Secretary must consider in
carrying out his or her responsibilities under the Act.' It sets out an
early form of risk-based decision making, but requires the Secretary to
consider a number of additional factors as well. Finally, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1231 (and the Administrative Procedures Act) sets out the procedures
to be followed and the stakeholders to be consulted in implementing the
Act and developing regulations."'
In carrying out their undertaking, risk management policy analysts
must be mindful of the limits of analogical reasoning, whether the
analogy is drawn from history (prior marine incidents) or similar systems
(air traffic control or shore-based pilotage). On closer examination,
apparent historical analogues may prove to differ substantially and
materially from the present situation.'12 And, as Mr. O'Neil warns in his
"hiding behind tradition" remark, excessive reliance on history may
93
hinder our ability to escape the pull of the prevailing paradigm.
Analogies to apparently similar systems may not withstand close scrutiny.
188. 532 E3d 913, 922-27 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (examining factors the PWSA required the
Coast Guard to consider with respect to its decisions regarding offshore vessel routing measures
to protect endangered right whales and criticizing the government's argument that the IMO, rather
than the U.S. Coast Guard, has the final authority over such decisions).
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(c)(2006).
190. Seeid § 1224(a).
191. Seeid § 1231(b).
192. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF
HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS ch. 5 (1986) (warning that careful review of apparent analogues
must be part of any analysis).
193.

See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS chs. 5-6 (2d ed.

1970) (discussing the priority of paradigms and the effect of anomalies).
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For example, in a thorough 1994 study, the NRC concluded that the
differences between aviation and maritime navigation "preclude the
aviation system from serving as an exact or even close operational model
for marine traffic regulation, although lessons can be learned and
adapted from the aviation experience."' ' Additionally, a recent study
revealed that shore-based pilotage, while a useful alternative when
conditions preclude boarding by a pilot, raises significant "control"
issues that limit its application beyond a narrow set of circumstances. 95
C

Use of Case Studies in Evaluating VTS Policy Options

When used consistent with the precautions appropriate to analogical
reasoning, case studies can serve as a useful tool for formulating and
By themselves, or in
evaluating alternative courses of action.
conjunction with constructed scenarios and simulations, case studies can
also be used to test the alternatives and to train operators-including
VTS operators, sector watch officers, pilots, and vessel crews--during
the policy implementation phase. It is important, however, that the
selected case studies and scenarios cover the full range of the VTS
continuum of vessel traffic management, including grounding and
allision cases, two-ship and multiple-ship collision cases, cases involving
vessels impaired by equipment, propulsion or steering casualties, and the
presence of vessels not equipped or required to participate in or
communicate with VTS. In addition, the full range of environmental
conditions should be considered. The task of collecting such case studies,
developing scenarios, and preparing simulations to test them on operators
might serve as the foundation for a VTS center of excellence, which
would facilitate CGVTS operational evaluations'96 and help promote
continuous improvement in the VTS program, in conjunction with the
194. MARiNE BD., supra note 26, at 185. The report goes on to warn that "although marine
traffic regulation analogous to the aviation model is technologically possible, it is not operationally
feasible as the marine navigation and piloting system is organized and operated." Id at 185; see
also id at 195 tbl.5-1 (contrasting the aviation and marine parameters).
195. Bruno & Liitzh6ft, supra note 123, at 433 (drawing on cognitive systems engineering
approach to identify problems impairing the ability of a person to establish control over a system
from a remote location). The authors also point out that, in practice, shoreside remote pilotage is
generally only available for ships that are so well equipped and manned that, though legally
obligated to take a pilot, "they might not necessarily need one." Id In another article, the same
authors emphasize that shore-based pilotage (SBP) is not a replacement for an onboard pilot.
SBP is strictly limited to vessels meeting certain requirements, is only available when the
alternative is for the vessel to wait for better weather, and is provided only over short distances.
See Karl Bruno & Margareta Liitzh6ft, Shore-BasedPilotage,SEAwAYS, Jan. 2009, at 15.
196. See VTS NATIONAL SOP, supra note 16, para. 5.A, at 5-1 (requiring operational
evaluations of VTSs every three years).

2009]

U.S. VESSEL TRAFFIC CENTERS

IMO, IALA, and the maritime training facilities. Finally, just as national
security strategists must guard against the temptation to prepare only to
fight the "last war" policy makers must also resist the temptation to
rework the marine risk management system in response to a single
incident like the COSCO BUSAN allision, if doing so would, on balance,
impair the system's capability to manage the full spectrum of risks
effectively.
D

Liability Considerations

Liability concerns often cast a shadow over any effort to recalibrate
risk management responsibilities.'97 Although comprehensive analysis of
potential government liability for VTS directions, warnings, or advice is
beyond the scope of this Article, such an analysis should be provided to
the relevant decision makers considering the advisability of changing the
existing regime. The IMO VTS Guidelines only briefly address VTS
liability before concluding that such issues will be governed by national
law."' Fifteen years ago, the NRC observed that "[liability issues have
yet to be resolved concerning VTS intervention to influence operator and
vessel behavior, let alone traffic control."'99 In its investigation into the
2002 collision between the DIAMANT and the NORTHERN
MERCHANT, the U.K. Marine Accident Investigation Branch cited
potential "legal action against the VTS" as one reason it hesitated to
endorse arguments for more direct interventions by VTSs. 2°' Even more
recently, in 2008, the DHS Inspector General warned that any decision
regarding a reallocation of responsibility for vessel control must consider
the liability implications in the event a casualty involving a compliant
vessel occurs. °'
The choice of terminology in denominating VTS interventions
should be carefully considered. Under the IMO SMCP, it is understood
that when a VTS issues a "warning" or provides "advice," the vessel
master must then decide what action should be taken."2 If the master
fails to act on the warning or recommendation, negligence may be found
197. See generally Edgar Gold, Legal and Liability Aspects of VTS Systems, in THE
NAuTICAL INSTTUTE ON PILOTAGE AND SHIPHANDLING 216-21 (1990); NICHOLAS J. HEALY &
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY, THE LAW OF MARINE COLLISION 162-65 (1998).

198. IMO VTS GuidelineMs supra note 10, annex 1,para. 2.2.4.
199. MARINE BD, supranote 26, at 194.
200. U.K. MAIB REPORT, supra note 147, para.2.6.1, at 43.
201. DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 9 (describing the "implications of
potential liability should a mishap occur while a vessel was complying with VTS operations
center direction").
202. SMCP, supra note 144, at 46.
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if a reasonably prudent master would have taken additional precautions;. 3
however, normally no civil or criminal penalties will be assessed for
breach of law or regulation. By contrast, the unexcused failure to follow
a lawful VTS "direction" (using U.S. terminology) or "instruction"
(SMCP terminology) constitutes a regulatory violation, for which a
penalty may be assessed (civil liability may also be imposed where the
violation constitutes causative fault).2" While it is true that the master
has discretion to take contrary action in spite of the direction, where the
"exigencies of safe navigation" require," 5 the burden of proving the
necessity of the action will likely be on the master.
The notion of asserting "control" over vessels is more problematic.
Assumption of "control" by the government might reduce or eliminate
the vessel operator's responsibility and liability (because the operator is
no longer in control) and increase the government's exposure (because it
is in control). Moving closer to the air traffic control model might well
lead to the more expansive government liability that characterizes
aviation torts in the United States."° While no responsible policy maker
would reject a measure that would save lives and reduce the total cost of
accidents simply because it might lead, by way of civil tort liability, to
some of the remaining costs being borne by the government, potential
liability and litigation costs will certainly be considered in the
government's overall cost-benefit analysis.
Congress could, as part of its PWSA amendment agenda, enact
clear liability provisions applicable to vessel traffic management and
control, as some states have done,"' in order to force those engaged in
203. The standard of care for a vessel master is not that of the ordinary reasonably prudent
person but rather a reasonable person with the special training and skills held by a member of that
profession. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
204. SMCP, supra note 144, at 46.
205. See 33 C.ER. § 161.1 (c) (2008) ("Compliance with these rules or with a direction of
the VTS is at all times contingent upon the exigencies of safe navigation.").
206. But see Allison K. Lawter, Comment, FreeFlight orFree Fall, I. AIR L. & CoM. 915,
952 (1997) ("While technology has improved the air traffic control system and made it more
efficient, it has not changed the pilot-in-command concept. Therefore, improved technology
should not shift to air traffic controllers the pilot's burden to fly safely... "). See generaflyJames
L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability of UnitedStates for NegligenceofAir Taffic Controller,
46 A.L.R. FED. 24 (1980 & Supp. 1989) (collecting cases holding that federal government may be
liable for negligence in providing air traffic services, even in cases falling short of an assumption
of "control").
207. See MARINE BD., supm note 99, app. D, at 22. The NRC reported that
there is widespread concern about potential tort liability associated with a VTIS that
provides information and/or directions that could be blamed for an accident. This
concern has driven some private VTIS operators to seek relief from liability under state
law or by working under the aegis of the Coast Guard. California passed legislation
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risk-generating activities to better internalize the cost of their activities;
but nothing suggests Congress will do so. As a result, the federal
government's liability for maritime torts arising out of an action or failure
to act by a Coast Guard VTS will be governed by the existing provisions
of the Suits in Admiralty Act (SlAA) °8 and the Supreme Court's
decisions in Ind an Towing Co. v United Stated' and the discretionary
function exception cases.21°
The Coast Guard's Marine Safety Manual suggests that potential
government liability for VTS control decisions would fall within the
discretionary function exception."' The present "permissive" PWSA
language, which authorizes directions to vessels when the Secretary or
the Secretary's delegee is satisfied that the direction is "justified in the
interest of safety' 2 2 does indeed suggest that any decision to issue, or not
to issue, an "order" to a vessel would fall within the discretionary
function exception to federal tort liability under the SIAA. 3 However, it
granting immunity to liability for negligence to employees and representatives of the
Marine Exchange and thus to the VTIS operators.
208. Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95,41 Stat. 525 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 3090130918 (2006)). The Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA), together with the related Public Vessels Act,
provides the exclusive remedy against the federal government for maritime torts.
209. 350 U.S. 61, 64-65, 1956 AMC 27, 30 (1955) (reasoning that although the federal
government may not be required to provide a particular service, if it chooses to do so and thereby
induces reliance on the service, it must exercise due care); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1965) ("One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another ...is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if, (a) his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.").
210. See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984) ("The discretionary function exception ...marks the
boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its
desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.").
211. 6 MARINE SAFETY MANUAL, supra note 78, at 1-24. Although the discretionary
function exception isnot expressly incorporated into the SIAA, as it is in the Federal Tort Claims
Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)), all of the federal circuits which have considered the issue have held
that the exception is implied in the SIAA. See McMellon v. United States, 387 E3d 329, 337-38,
2004 AMC 2553, 2561-64 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert denied, 544 U.S. 974,2005 AMC 2999
(2005).
212. 33 U.S.C. § 1233(b)(3) (2006).
213. The negligent search and rescue cases, carried out under the permissive authority of
14 U.S.C. § 88, might serve as a useful guide. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Liability
of Coast Guardfor Injury to Persons orProperty While Engagedin Rescue Activities, 11 A.L.R.
FED. 2D 779 (2006). On the other hand, recent cases assigning fault to stand-on vessels for failing
to take avoiding action permitted but not required by COLREGS Rule 17(a)(ii) demonstrate that
government liability might be found where a VTS failed to exercise permissive authority to
intervene. For an examination of the Rule 17 cases, see CRAIG H. ALLEN, FARWELL'S RULES OF
THE NAUTICAL ROAD 269-75 (8th ed. 2005). Potential liability in such cases could be
compounded by the Supreme Court's surprising application of the superseding cause doctrine to
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must always be asked when the discretion ends and the affirmative
undertaking begins-particularly when the agency's own directives refer
to VTS vessel management activities as a "continuum." The Court's
decision in Indian Towing demonstrates that in a tort liability analysis the
decision whether to assume the Good Samaritan role and provide a
discretionary service (aids to navigation or VTSs) must be distinguished
from the manner in which the service is carried out."' Negligence in the
latter case generally falls outside of the discretionary function
exception."
E

Is New LegislationNeeded?

Bearing in mind the policy analysis framework outlined above, the
international authorities on the role of VTS, the IMO member states'
216
concern with divergent and therefore confusing VTS practices,
congressional findings and policies announced in the PWSA and its
amendments, the principles of risk assessment and management, and the
tentative assumption that our overarching goal is to maximize net social
welfare by minimizing the total cost of accidents," 7 we are at last
prepared to confront the question of whether the existing framework for
shoreside VTS control over vessel movements should be amended. This
is not the first time Congress has raised questions regarding the need for
additional authority. As discussed below, nearly twenty years ago, in the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Congress directed the Secretary to conduct a
excuse causative negligence. See Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. SOFEC, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 836-39, 1996
AMC 1817, 1821-23 (1996).
214. It will be recalled, however, that in the Indian Towing case, the government conceded
that its conduct was "operational" and that the discretionary function exception was not in play in
that case. 350 U.S. at 64, 1956 AMC at 30.
215. Amending the statute, regulation, or policy directives to reduce VTS discretion may
also expose the government to greater liability. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536
(1988) ("[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation,
or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. In this event, the
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. And if the employee's conduct
cannot appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the
conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect.").
216. See supm note 56 and accompanying text.
217. See GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ch. 9 (1970). The total cost of accidents includes the costs of preventing accidents or mitigating
their effects plus the cost of those accidents not prevented. Although in a negligence context the
law generally does not require a risk generator to undertake accident prevention or mitigation
measures where the cost of those measures exceeds the probability-discounted expected cost of
the accident if not prevented (as expressed in the familiar Learned Hand formula B < P x L),
legislation-even legislation ostensibly grounded on cost-benefit analysis-might require more
than the negligence standard of care would call for. The modem trend toward ever greater risk
aversion bears that out.
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study "of whether the Secretary should be given additional authority to
direct the movement of vessels on navigable waters and should exercise
' The answer in 1993 was "no.' ' 21 9 What might have
such authority."218
changed since then?
1.

Is There a Problem?

An amendment to an agency's authority, in this case either a
clarification of existing authority or an expansion of that authority, is
warranted where the existing statute no longer expresses the will of the
legislature (prescriptive inadequacy or ambiguity) or fails to achieve the
desired result (compliance inadequacy). Such conclusions usually follow
from actual case studies; in this case, the COSCO BUSAN allision.22 ' As
to the first possible inadequacy, we can ask "Did VTS San Francisco
have the legal authority to timely direct the movements of the COSCO
BUSAN to avoid an allision with the bridge?" If the answer is "yes," the
second question is "Was the authority sufficiently clear so that the VTS
understood it had the authority?" A third question which might be raised,
but is not suggested in the pending bills, is whether the VTS had not
merely the authority to direct the movements of the vessel but an
affirmative duty to do so. This last question raises issues relevant to the
application of the discretionary function exception to government tort
liability.
Is additional legal authority needed to clarify or expand VTS
control over vessels? The DHS Inspector General, NTSB, and Coast
Guard do not think so. The DHS Inspector General report concluded:
Current legislation already provides the Coast Guard with the authority
over vessel traffic necessary to protect life, property, and the marine
environment. It would be speculative to suggest that additional Coast
Guard authority over vessel traffic in and of itself would prevent future
mishaps in the San Francisco Bay. The Coast Guard would need to
reevaluate several aspects of its VTS program before a decision can be
made to change the VTS operations center's role from being primarily a
navigational and advisory service tool to one which exercises direct control
over all vessel movement, similar to that of an air traffic control center.
218. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 1990), Pub. L. No. 101-380, tit. IV, § 4107(b), 104
Stat. 484, 514 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(2)).
219. U.S. SEC'Y OF TRANSP., DEP'T OF TRANSP., VTS CONTROL STUDY: STUDY OVERVIEW 1
(Mar. 1993) (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter VTS CONTROL STUDY].
220. Two kinds of lessons can be learned from the incident and then factored into any
"problem" statement. The first and most obvious would come from some combination of fault,
vulnerability, and causation analysis. The second lesson is the public and legislative reaction to
the incident and what that teaches risk managers about risk tolerance levels in the United States.
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The Coast Guard would also need to determine whether VTS operations
center equipment capability, manpower, training, and funding requirements

are adequate for this expanded role, as well as assess the implications of
potential liability should a mishap occur while a vessel was complying with
VTS operations center direction.22'
Similarly, the NTSB recommendations focused on the need for the Coast
Guard to define expectations for the use of its "existing authority" and
did not suggest the need for additional authority." The Coast Guard
itself visited the vessel control issue in response to congressional tasking
in OPA 1990 and again in the course of its 1994 VTS rulemaking. The
Coast Guard completed the study required by OPA 1990 in 1993 and
concluded that "the current level of authority provided by existing
legislation is sufficient for the safe direction of vessel movements." 3 It
came to the same conclusion in the course of its comprehensive 1994
VTS notice and comment rulemaking project.2 Moreover, the fact that
Coast Guard VTSs already assert such control as a general practice in
some locations,"'5 and in particular incidents in others,"' strongly suggests
that well before the COSCO BUSAN incident the authority was adequate,
understood, and used when appropriate. In 2009, in response to the
NTSB report and its VTS recommendations, the Coast Guard asked the
Navigation Safety Advisory Council (NAVSAC) to review current VTS
authorities, operational procedures to exercise authority, and VTS
watchstander training. In addition, after development of new VTS
procedures by the Coast Guard, NAVSAC was asked to review the
proposed changes. The Council unanimously concluded that the current
laws and regulations give Coast Guard VTS sufficient authority to
monitor, inform, and direct the movement of vessels.227
221. DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supm note 3, at 9.
222. NTSB REPORT, supra note 4, at 137 (NTSB Recommendation M-09-3).
223. VTS CONTROL STUDY,supra note 219, at 1.
224. See U.S. Coast Guard, Final Rule, National Vessel Traffic Services Regulations (VTS
Final Rules), 59 Fed. Reg. 36,316 (July 15, 1994) ("This rulemaking does not significantly
change Coast Guard VTS procedures or requirements.").
225. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
226. For example, in 1990, VTS Puget Sound ordered a foreign flag bulk carrier that was
inbound in the Juan de Fuca Strait traffic separation scheme to execute a ninety-degree turn to
starboard to avoid immediate danger of collision with an outbound tanker. The incident occurred
at approximately 00:35 local time on June 10, 1990, near the Port Angeles, Washington, pilot
station. At the time of the VTS intervention, the vessel, which had not yet embarked its pilot, was
well clear of any shoal water or other hazards. The embarrassed vessel master promptly complied
without objection. No one suggested that the VTS action was ulta virs. See E-mail from Coast
Guard VTS Personnel to author (July 29,2002, 17:01 PST) (on file with author).
227. Navigation Safety Advisory Council Resolution 09-03 (2009) (Vessel Traffic Services
Communications Procedures and Authority) (on file with author). Similarly, the 2008 San
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If neither the Coast Guard, NAVSAC, the DHS Inspector General,
nor a majority of the NTSB believes that additional authority is required,
why do some members of Congress apparently think an amendment is
needed? Three possibilities present themselves. The most obvious
answer is that Senate Bill 685's sponsors simply disagree with others
who have reviewed the statute and instead believe additional authority is
needed (problem #1). A second possible explanation is that they are
concerned that existing legislation is not sufficiently clear or explicit
(problem #2).228 Under that view, a clarification might be intended to
allay any lingering doubts individual sector commanders or VTC
watchstanders might harbor under the existing regime. A report by the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation suggests
this may be the case. It explains the intent of Senate Bill 685 as follows:
Section 3 would clarfythe Coast Guard's authority to direct the movement
of vessel traffic in a VTS area and would require the Coast Guard to
develop and distribute guidance to VTS personnel that clearly defines the
authority to direct vessel movement when it is in the best interest of safety.
The provision would direct the Coast Guard to conduct an assessment of
the need for new, expanded, or improved vessel traffic management
measures. The provision also would set forth additional navigational
training requirements for Coast Guard VTS watch stander personnel. This
provision is based on the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB)
recommendation from the Cosco Busan incident.229
A third explanation is that the Bill's sponsors want to override the Coast
Guard's current VTS policy on the exercise of actual control over vessels
(problem #3). By singling out directions to "change the vessel's heading
or speed," the Bill conflicts with, and would therefore supersede, the
Coast Guard's policy on such orders. If that is indeed the Bill's sponsors'
intent, the Bill would not only override the Coast Guard's VTS policy, it
might well have implications for other mission areas, such as search and
Francisco Bay PAWSA concluded that the risks and risk mitigation measures for the Bay,
including the area's vessel traffic management measures, were well balanced. See U.S. COAST
GuARD SECTOR SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 35, at 21.

228. The Lautenberg bill would affect more than just a VTS's authority to control traffic.
By inserting the change in the section 1223(b) chapeauparagraph, the authority to order course
and speed changes will apply to all three of the listed circumstances under which the Secretary
may exercise the Act's "special powers." See S. 685, 111 th Cong. § 3(a) (2009). The new authority
would extend to "any vessel, in a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or in
the navigable waters of the United States"--even if not within a VTS area. Id; 33 U.S.C.
§ 1223(b) (2006).
229. S.REP. No. 111-026, at 7 (2009) (emphasis added). While this characterization of the
legislation is generally accurate, close examination of the NTSB Report reveals no
recommendation to provide statutory authorization to direct a vessel operator to "change the
vessel's heading and speed," as the Bill proposes.
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rescue (discussed below), and would put the United States somewhat at
odds with the IMO VTS Guidelines.
2.

Evaluation Criteria

The policy goals set out in the PWSA, briefly adverted to in Part
III.B of this Article, are quite broad. They include the safety and security
of ports, waterways, vessels, cargoes, bridges, and personnel, as well as
protection of the environment. 2 ° To achieve these ends, the Act calls for,
inter alia, increased supervision of vessel and port operations 23 ' and
authorizes the Secretary to exercise "special powers" to control vessel
traffic.232 At the same time, the Act identifies certain international law
considerations applicable to the exercise of U.S. authority.233 The Act
then sets out "[c]onsiderations by [the] Secretary" in exercising his or her
duties and responsibilities under section 1223 of the Act. 234 They include
"all relevant factors concerning navigation and vessel safety [and]
protection of the marine environment," including, but not limited to, the
scope and degree of risk or hazard involved, vessel traffic characteristics
and trends, environmental factors, economic impacts and costs, and local
practices and customs. 2

5

The Act also prescribes a duty to consult with

and receive the views of key stakeholders and advisory bodies.236
Consultations are facilitated in most ports through harbor safety
committees.237
Policy choice evaluations must consider both the likelihood that a
new policy will produce a particular outcome and, for those choices that
are likely to produce the desired outcome, their relative efficacy. In the
case of VTS direction and control, two possible outcomes must be
considered: a VTS order to a vessel might (1) prevent an accident that
would likely have occurred without VTS intervention or (2) result in an
230. See33 U.S.C. § 1221.
231. Id § 1221(c).
232. Id. § 1223(b).
233. Id § 1223(d). Any change to CGVTS doctrine must be mindful that, at present, one
Coast Guard VTS (VTS Puget Sound) is a transnational, "cooperative" VTS, with responsibility
shared between the United States and Canada. Any control procedures for CGVTSs must be
coordinated by both states.
234. Id.§ 1224.
235. Id. § 1224(a); see also IMO VTS Guidelines,supm note 10, annex 1, para. 2.1 (setting
out internationally recognized "objectives" of vessel traffic services).
236. 33 U.S.C. § 1224(b).
237. See U.S. COAST GUARD, GUIDANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF
HARBOR SAFETY CoMMrrrEES UNDER THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYsTEM (MTS) INITIIVE,
NAVIGATION AND VESSEL INSPECTION CIRCULAR (NVIC) No. 1-00 (2000); see also VTS NATIONAL

SOP, supra note 16, para. 7.1, at 7-3.

2009]

U.S. VESSEL TRAFFIC CENTERS

accident that would not have occurred had the VTS not intervened. Any
policy choice must weigh both the probability and associated costs and
benefits of each potential outcome.
Criteria specific to the effectiveness of established VTSs, regarding
the full range of VTS services and management activities, may be more
difficult to find-particularly in the case of VTS instructions or
directions to vessels. In its 1994 Minding the Helm report, the Marine
Board of the NRC acknowledged that available data demonstrated that
VTS operations have provided substantial benefits, but nevertheless
concluded that an acceptable analytical method had not yet been
developed to fully measure the effectiveness of VTS systems relative to
the factors that affect operational risk.23 Similarly, while not defining
VTS efficiency or providing criteria for assessing it, the IMO's VTS
Guidelines conclude that VTS efficiency does depend on the reliability
and continuity of communications and the ability to provide good quality
and unambiguous information."' The Guidelines then look beyond the

information services function and assert that "[t]he quality of accident
prevention measures will depend on the system's capability of detecting a
developing dangerous situation and on the ability to give timely warning
of such dangers."24 Missing from the criteria for assessing a given VTS's
efficiency in its performance of navigation assistance services is any
mention of VTS instructions or directions to vessels.
3.

Identifying and Evaluating the Alternatives

Assuming, without conceding, that the existing legal framework is
inadequate in its prescription or implementation (problem # 1 above), and
that our task would be to determine which of the essential features of a
successful and effective VTS navigation assistance service function are
missing from the present scheme, several alternatives present themselves.
Any inadequacy in the prescriptions could be addressed through
legislation, regulations issued under authority of existing legislation,4 ' or
238. MARINE BD., supra note 26, at 203.
239. IMO VTS Guidelines, supra note 10, annex 1, para. 2.1.3. To some extent, widespread
use of AIS to transmit data formerly exchanged between the vessel and VTS operators by VHF
radio can undermine the effectiveness of communications in an emergency if the absence of prior
radio exchanges leads to diminished rapport or trust.
240. Id
241. Given the broad language of the present statutory authorization and policy objectives,
such regulations would presumably be entitled to deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) ("When a challenge to an agency construction of a
statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy,
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge
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clarifying internal agency directives. 24 ' The latter two options are
discussed below. If the goal is to expand the agency's authority or to
make some or all of the vessel control function mandatory, legislation is
called for. If, on the other hand, the goal is merely to clarify existing
authority or to remove ambiguities (problem #2), that goal is more
readily and flexibly accomplished through agency regulations, perhaps in
conjunction with, or in response to, congressional committee hearings
that ask agency officials to confirm their understandings of existing
authority.
At first glance, it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that
legislation calling for more frequent and/or direct interventions by VTSs
would cost little or nothing and has the potential to confer significant
public benefits in avoided accident costs. However, those suppositions
might not survive close scrutiny across the full range of accident
scenarios.4 3 Too many analyses fall prey to the presumption that all
CGVTS interventions will be successful.2 " The sheer numbers call such
assumptions into serious doubt. Taking VTS San Francisco as an
example, in a given year the center manages the transit of over 120,000
vessels. 5 An intervention rate of just one percent would mean that VTS
operators would be "intervening" (through warnings, recommendations,
and directions) in vessel navigation decisions over 1200 times each year.
If just ten percent of the interventions involved directions to vessels, VTS
operators could be issuing ten such directions each month. Even with
additional staff and "intervention" training, it is by no means certain that
VTS operators would, under the circumstances, make the correct choice
(and override the vessel's choice or pilot's choice) in all of those
must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.").
242. Under the discretionary function exception analysis set out by the United States
Supreme Court in Berkowit2, it does not matter whether constraints on the exercise of discretion
are imposed by statute, regulation, or agency policy directives. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the discretionary function exception).
243. The DHS Inspector General warned that expanding the role of CGVTS would require
a reassessment of resources. See DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supranote 3, at 9.
244. Any assumption that intervention decisions will always come out well ignores the fact
that the actual decisions will always be time-constrained and therefore made under conditions of
stress and uncertainty. In approaching historical case studies one must be mindful of the strong
tendency for after-the-fact reanalysis to lead to a conclusion that those who were responsible
simply failed to "connect the dots" and thereby prevent the incident. Such analyses generally fail,
however, to recognize that '[t]he occurrence of an event increases its reconstructed probability
and makes it less surprising than it would have been had the original probability been
remembered."' Malcolm Gladwell, Connecting the Dots, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 85
(quoting psychologist Baruch Fischoff).
245. DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (reporting that in 2007 the VTS
handled 124,762 vessel transits).
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interventions. For a variety of reasons, shoreside personnel will
generally have less information than those on the vessel and less time to
formulate and execute a decision."6 If, for example, one adopts the
familiar OODA loop approach,247 the time available for a shoreside VTS
operator to (1) observe, (2) orient, (3) decide, and (4) act will almost
certainly be longer than that available for a person on board the ship, who
will likely have completed the first two steps before the VTS operator
even becomes aware that a situation that might require a decision to
control the vessel is developing. Additionally, more frequent VTS
interventions might lead to decision aversion, hesitation, or even
paralysis, whereby the master, pilot, and VTS operator or supervisor all
wait at the threshold of OODA step 3, while wondering who really has
control. Accordingly, a decision calling for a more proactive posture on
interventions must weigh not only the "missed opportunities" seen in
hindsight in cases like that of the COSCO BUSAN, but also the cost of
the occasional wrong VTS decision or of delayed decisions by those on
board the vessel.
Finally, if the Bill's sponsors' goal is to override the current Coast
Guard policy on the use of course or speed orders to vessels, inserting the
new language in the current Bill is unlikely to accomplish that goal.
Senate Bill 685 would amend 33 U.S.C. § 1223 to read:
(b) SPECIAL POWERS-The Secretary may order any vessel, in a port
or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or in the
navigable waters of the United States, to epeete e opemte, including
direction to change the vessels heading and speed or anchor in a

manner he directs if(3)

... by reason of weather, visibility, sea conditions, port congestion,

other emergency or hazardous circumstances, or the condition of
such vessel, he 24is8 satisfied that such directive is justified in the
interest of safety.
Thus, any decision to assert control under this section of the amended
statute would still be subject to a discretionary finding by the VTS that
246. Those who analogize the decision to the "pilot-ashore" practice used (with strict
limitations) in ports, and argue that such examples undermine arguments against the practicality
of shoreside vessel control, fail to recognize important distinctions between the two situations,
including the fact that the "pilot-ashore" is in fact a pilot, not a VTS operator, and at all times the
on-board master still bears ultimate responsibility for the vessel's safe navigation.
247. The "OODA loop" approach to analyzing the human decision making process was
developed by U.S. Air Force pilot Colonel John Boyd. In some marine situation awareness
models, the first two predecision OODA elements are further broken down into observation,
understanding, and forecasting how the situation will develop.
248. SeeS. 685, 11lth Cong. § 3 (2009); 33 U.S.C. § 1223(b) (2006).
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an order to a particular vessel to change course or speed is "justified in
the interest of safety."
4.

Conclusion: New Legislation Is Both Unnecessary and Unwise

The proposed amendment is neither necessary nor wise. It is
unnecessary because the historical record demonstrates that existing
authority is adequate and sufficiently clear to guide the Coast Guard in
promulgating regulations and internal directives that implement the
statute and provide its VTS personnel with guidance that clearly defines
the Agency's expectation for the use of its vessel direction and control
authority. The COSCO BUSAN experience is not to the contrary. The
foggy conditions over San Francisco Bay on the morning of the COSCO
BUSAN's allision, like the icebergs and darkness in Prince William
Sound at the time of the EXXON VALDEZ's grounding, plainly fall
within the circumstances set out in the PWSA for the Coast Guard to
conclude that an "order" to the vessel might be justified in the interest of
safety.249 That authority has already been delegated to the Coast Guard
sector commander and VTS.250 Nothing suggests that the VTS San
Francisco watchstanders failed to act because they did not believe they
had the authority to intervene.
On balance, the proposed legislation is also unwise. Even though it
is touted as a "clarification" of existing authority in the accompanying
Senate Report,25' the actual language used in the proposed statute is
grammatically awkward, 252 nautically unsound, 253 and would only
introduce confusion. Moreover, it emphasizes one step in the continuum
of vessel traffic management measures (that is, vessel course and speed
control) at the expense of others. A balanced approach would use
standard terminology and put greater emphasis on the use of warnings,
recommendations, and result-based directions. 54 As presently drafted,
249. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(b)(3). The Bill's addition of "other emergency" adds little or
nothing to the broader category of "hazardous circumstances."
250. 33 C.ER. §§ 160.5(d), 161.1(b), 161.1 l(b) (2008).
251. See S. REP. No. 111-026, at 7 (2009) ("Section 3 would clarify the Coast Guard's
authority....").
252. The amended statute would authorize the Secretary to order a vessel to "operate,
including direction to change the vessel's heading and speed, or anchor in a manner he directs." S.
685, 111 th Cong. § 3(a)(1).
253. Mariners do not order "heading" changes, but rather "course" changes. "Heading"
refers to the direction the ship actually points at any given moment. By contrast, "course" is the
direction in which a vessel is steered or intended to be steered. See U.S. NAT'L IMAGERY &
MAPPING AGENCY, supm note 9, glossary, at 745.
254. The IMO VTS Guidelines recommend that any message directed to a vessel should
use the IMO SMCP phrases where practicable. IMO VTS Guidelines, supra note 10, annex 1,
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the Bill would put the United States at odds with the IMO Guidelines and
would compel the Coast Guard to change the current SOP, whichconsistent with the IMO Guidelines-states that VTS should not
normally direct a course to be steered or engine orders to be executed.255
It bears repeating here that the IMO Guidelines grew out of international
concern over potential variability in VTS procedures from port to port
and the confusion it would create for vessels that operate in several VTS
areas. Additionally, the IMO cited the member states' belief that safety
and efficiency of maritime traffic and protection of the marine
environment will be improved if VTSs are established and operated in
accordance with internationally approved guidelines.
Finally, the
proposed change might lead to mariner complacency if it is perceived as
a congressional judgment that navigation and collision avoidance
responsibility should be shifted from the vessel's on board "team" to
shoreside VTS operators. This might actually reduce the safety level
both within VTS areas and even outside those areas, as mariners
increasingly look shoreward for decisions and direction. Consider, for
example, the COSCO BUSAN master's statement that because the Coast
Guard had not closed the port to navigation due to fog on the day of the
allision, he believed that it was safe to get underway. This rationalization
by a master mariner should give reformers pause. The same assumption,
however misdirected, might be asserted by a master in a future case
where a VTS could have, but failed to, take control of a vessel.
If Congress is truly serious about improving waterway safety by
enhancing the role of the Coast Guard VTS, it should focus instead on
funding the much needed recapitalization of the aging VTS
infrastructure.. and creating a VTS training program on par with air
traffic control training programs. Even if the Coast Guard has ample
authority under the amended PWSA to succeed in its VTS mission, it
para. 2.4.1. The SMCP includes a wide variety of VTS terminology and a glossary of VTS
special terms. The VTS phrases are organized into (1) information service phrases, (2) navigational assistance service phrases, and (3) traffic organization service phrases. See IMO Res.
A.918(22), supranote 144, at 4.
255. VTS NATIONAL SOP, supra note 16, para. 2.B.2.d, at 2-2. Experienced mariners will
immediately recognize a host of potential problems with issuing heading (course) or speed orders
to vessels. For example, in giving a vessel a course to steer one might need to know: What kind
of compass is the helmsman steering by? What is its compass error? Given existing and
expected set and drift, what course should the vessel steer to make good the desired course? How
much rudder should be used to accomplish the course change? Note, too, that S. 685 authorizes
orders to change "heading" not course.
256. The DHS Inspector General Report indicates that the 1990-era equipment at the San
Francisco VTS at the time of the COSCO BUSAN incident was not up to date and that planned
upgrades were not completed due to funding constraints in 2003-04. See DHS INSPECTOR GEN.
REPoRT, swpra note 3, at 7-8.
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cannot do so if it lacks the capability or capacity.257 In assessing the
legislative commitment to an effective VTS program, one cannot help but
recall how Congress turned
its back on the Coast Guard's "VTS 2000"
25 8
vision in the late 1990s.
E

Should the Coast GuardAmendIts VTS Regulations,Directives,or
StandardOperatingProcedures?

In the absence of new legislation, any decision to amend existing
regulations implementing the PWSA or the agency's internal directives
or operating procedures is best treated as an occasion to reevaluate an
earlier policy decision, rather than a decision to adopt a new policy. A
policy decision should be reevaluated in light of either new observations
or data that are materially and significantly different from the data relied
upon in the original assessment or new analytical methods or approaches
that afford better insight, descriptive or predictive accuracy, or utility.
Several VTS developments and approaches since 1994 might suggest a
need to revisit the regulations or internal directives and the policies that
underlie them. Some of the most significant developments since 1994
are the growing internationalization of VTS policy, procedures, and
training standards, the use of offshore reporting and routing measures,
and the standards for watchkeeping in the STCW Code. Major Coast
Guard reorganizations since 1994 have also rendered parts of the current
VTS regulations obsolete. Significant changes in the marine transportation system, particularly the number of vessels, their size, speed, and
passenger capacities, and rapid and far-reaching technological developments, present a very different marine safety and traffic management
challenge today. Finally, risk managers must always be alert to shifts in
public risk perception and risk tolerance. Most would agree that the
public and their elected representatives have grown much more risk
averse since 1994.
257. In assessing CGVTS issues, it is important to recall that the VTS is part of a larger
Coast Guard sector, providing authorities, capabilities, and capacities beyond those of the VTS.
258. The 1997 Department of Transportation appropriations bill prohibited funds for
continuing the VTS 2000 program, citing the need for further studies by the General Accounting
Office (as it was then called) and Marine Board of the National Academy of Sciences. See H.R.
REP. No. 104-871, at 61-62 (1996) (Summary of Legislative and Oversight Activities) (1996); see
also H.R. REP. No. 104-631, at 25 (1997) ("It is the Committee's firm intention that [VTS 2000]
be terminated by the Coast Guard, and that the service immediately begin exploration of low-cost,
off-the-shelf alternatives to VTS 2000 in cooperation and close coordination with affected port
authorities, waterway operators, and other system users."). The Marine Board study cited by the
Committee was completed in 1996. See MARINE BD., supra note 99; see also MARINE BD., NAT'L
RESEARCH CouNcIL (NRC), APPLYING ADVANCED INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO PORTS AND
WATERWAYS MANAGEMENT (1999).
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Amendments to Coast Guard VTS Regulations

Despite those new developments, for the most part the Coast Guard
VTS regulations adequately implement the authority for CGVTSs to
provide services and carry out their management activities. No major
substantive change to the regulations is called for. However, like the
navigation safety regulations, which have not kept pace with emerging
technologies and related e-Navigation practices,259 the present VTS rules
are in need of an update. Because they do not reflect the service's
current organization, some might question the validity or effect of
current delegations. Those regulations are, in some respects, also
inconsistent with the IMO's VTS Guidelines and the wider use of the
Standard
Marine
Communication
Phrases
in
VTS-vessel
communications. Finally, although the regulations acknowledge the
requirement for and content of VTS user's manuals, they do not address
the role or effect of, or public access to, the national or local standard
operating procedure documents. Other than those changes to the
regulations (and recognizing how painfully slow and difficult federal
rulemaking has become), CGVTS policies, procedures and training, and
qualification standards should be established by agency directives and
standard operating procedures, and then described in the relevant VTS
user's manuals.
2.

Amendments to Coast Guard Directives and SOPs

Precisely because the Coast Guard has discretionary authority to
control vessel traffic, and because the PWSA requires the agency to
consider a number of local factors in its decision making, it will be
important for the Coast Guard to establish-in conjunction with the
relevant harbor safety committee-a framework for the exercise of that
authority, communicate to VTS users the parameters of such use, and
train its VTS personnel to exercise that authority within the framework
provided.2" Such a framework should assign decision control to those to
whom the PWSA-VTS vessel traffic management and control powers
have been delegated, while ensuring consistency with the PWSA criteria
and processes.
259. In response to a serious backlog in its rulemaking, the Coast Guard's Marine Safety
Performance Plan pledges to increase the agency's rulemaking capacity. U.S. COAST GUARD,
MARINE SAFETY PERFORMANCE PLAN 10 (Nov. 2008), availableat http://homeport.uscg.mil/cgibin/st/portal/uscgjdocs/MyCG/Editorial/20081210/MSPerformancePlan.pdfid-f6f41b564e6c96
73f7c465c 1650fe08a52ab89c8.
260. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE ch. 4 (1971) (discussing
need to structure discretionary authority and the methods commonly used for doing so).
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The NTSB recommended that the Coast Guard provide guidance
that "clearly defines expectations for the use of existing authority [not an
expansion of that authority] to direct or control vessel movement when
such action is justified in the interest of safety."26 ' Similarly, the DHS
Inspector General concluded that although VTS San Francisco already
had the authority to control traffic at the time of the COSCO BUSAN
allision, the VTS San Francisco operational procedures in place did not
"provide watchstanders with the criteria necessary for determining the
specific measures and when they should be implemented during varying
26
conditions of restricted visibility.""
The report went on to say that
"[w]ithout well-defined criteria, VTS watchstanders could fail to
implement vessel movement measures when they are prudent or could
implement vessel movement measures that are overly restrictive for the
' At the same time, however, it warned that the
existing conditions." 63
"Coast Guard would need to reevaluate several aspects of its VTS
program before a decision can be made to change the VTS operations
center's role from being primarily a navigational and advisory service
tool to one which exercises direct control over all vessel movement,
similar to that of an air traffic control center."26'
a.

Coast Guard Policy on Exercising Control

In deciding whether to adopt a more proactive approach to VTS
intervention, the entire MTS should be considered. Any decision to
move closer to a shoreside-centered approach to vessel navigation and
control must recognize that VTS geographic coverage and participation
is not universal. The United States has 360 commercial ports, 95,000
miles of coastline, and 25,000 miles of navigable waterways; yet it has
established only a dozen VTSs. 265 Had the COSCO BUSAN-bridge
allision occurred in Boston, Philadelphia, or Miami, where no VTSs have
been established, there would be no discussion of the VTS role.
Moreover, under existing rules, only power-driven vessels 40 meters (131
feet) or longer, towing vessels 8 meters (26 feet) or longer, and passenger
vessels certificated to carry 50 or more passengers are required to

261. NTSB REPORT, supranote4, at 137.
262. DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supm note 3, at 8.
263. Id
264. Id at 9. The report also acknowledged that such a move would require an assessment
of VTS equipment, capability, manpower, training, and funding. Id
265. MTS STRATEGY, supra note 12, at 15.
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participate in a VTS.2" As a result, vessels and their pilots will often find

themselves operating beyond the reach of any VTS.
The policy should also recognize that in most of the potential
intervention cases, the master, pilot, and VTS will not share a common
knowledge or experience base or operating picture, and that each is likely
to have information the other does not.267 Each will also be faced with
uncertainties that may or may not be shared by others. Again drawing on
the COSCO BUSAN example, only the master and pilot knew the
vessel's heading at any given time (such information was not available to
the VTS268). Similarly, even in restricted visibility, a vessel keeping a
proper lookout will almost certainly see and hear things, such as the

sound of cars on a bridge overhead, waves lapping on a breakwater, or
the bell on the upcoming turn buoy, of which the VTS operator ashore
will be unaware. Accordingly, in developing scenarios to test any new
policy, the alternatives should be validated through simulations involving
VTS operators, supervisors, and actual masters and pilots with experi-

ence in VTS operating areas.
Assuming interventions are inevitable, the terminology used in such
actions by VTSs in the United States should, as much as practicable,
conform to the IMG VTS Guidelines. 69 The SMCPs were written with

the conviction, forged through innumerable accidents and near-accidents,
that the choice of terminology matters. Confusing a warning with a
recommendation or assuming that all "directions" amount to an
assumption of "control" of the vessel fails to respect important

differences in the relevant terminology. The IMO Guidelines (as

266. 33 C.ER. § 161.16 (2008).
267. For example: What is the turning radius and stopping distance of this ship? What is
its present heading? How fast is it turning? How competent is the helmsman? How well/quickly
does he execute commands? What does the current feather trailing off buoy 22 tell me? Did the
ship ahead just sound two short blasts? Three short blasts? Is the bearing to the approaching ship
constant or drifting right or left?
268. See NTSB REPORT, supm note 4, at 69 ("Even though AIS broadcasts a ship's heading
at regular intervals, the [system] in use by VTS San Francisco at the time of the [COSCO
BUSAN incident] could not be configured to display heading information to VTS operators."
(alterations added)).
269. The IMO Guidelines also recommend that communications be conducted in
accordance with the IMO's Guidelines and Criteria for Shp Reporting Systems (IMO Res.
MSC.43(64) (Dec. 9, 1994)). See iMO VTS Guidelines,supra note 10, annex 1, para. 2.4.1. The
IMO VTS Guidelines recommend that any message directed to a vessel should use the IMO
Standard Marine Communication Phrases where practicable. Id. The SMCP includes a wide
variety of VTS terminology and a glossary of VTS special terms. The VTS phrases are organized
into (1) information service phrases, (2) navigational assistance service phrases, and (3) traffic
organization service phrases. See IMO Res. A.918(22), supra note 144, at 4.

TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:91

amplified by the SMCPs) recommend that any message directed to a
vessel should make it clear whether the message contains:
Informatior, indicating that the message is restricted to observed
facts, situations, etc., and that the consequences of the message are
up to the recipient;
*
Advice, indicating that the message implies the intention of the
sender to influence others by a recommendation and that, although
the advice should be considered very carefully, it does not
necessarily have to be followed and the decision whether to follow
the advice stays with the recipient;
*
Warning. indicating that the message implies the intention of the
sender to inform others about danger and that, although the
recipient should pay immediate attention to the danger mentioned,
the consequences of the message will be up to the recipient; or
*
Instructiolz indicating that the message implies the intention of the
sender to influence others by a regulation. Instructions are given
only by one with authority to issue them. The recipient has to
follow this legally binding message unless s/he has contradictory
safety reasons, which then have to be reported to the sender.27
In developing standard terminology in VTS SOPs and
understanding the effect of particular phrases, it may be helpful to
consider well-established formalities for the passing of conning
responsibility on U.S. warships. On Coast Guard cutters and U.S. Navy
warships, navigation guidelines distinguish the responsibilities of the
officer having the "deck" from those of the person having the "conn"
with the latter assigned the responsibility for "control" of the vessel's
movements.27 ' As with merchant vessels, the commanding officer of a
warship is always in command of the vessel, but does not usually have
the conn. That responsibility is usually assigned to a junior officer who
has met the necessary qualifications. Formal announcements (for
example, "This is Mr. Bowditch, I have the conn") and log entries
accompany a transfer of the conn from one officer to another. Similar
formalities should attend any VTS instruction to control a ship. VTS
operators and supervisors must understand their authority, the criteria for
exercising control over vessels, and the consequences of doing so. They
must also understand and clearly inform the vessel of the scope and

270.
271.

See IMO VTS Guidelines,supra note 10, annex 1, para. 2.4.2.
See JAMES STAVRIDIS, WATCH OFFICER'S GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALL DECK WATCH

OFFICERS 75 (14th ed. 2000) (explaining that to "conn" means to control the movements of the
ship).
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duration of that control, to avoid any misunderstanding over when
control is restored to the vessel.
b.

Coast Guard Policy on VTS Operator Training and
Qualifications

Maritime states, including the United States, working through the
IMO and JALA, have been instrumental in developing a thoughtful and
comprehensive approach to VTS operator and supervisor training and
qualification standards. Those standards recognize that any training
program must address the respective knowledge and skills. 2 required for
VTS operators and supervisors. Both knowledge and skills are
indispensable to the operator's ability to make and implement decisions
under conditions of uncertainty across all four areas of the continuum.273
In addition to knowledge and skill dimensions, the prospective VTS
operator's or supervisor's judgment should be assessed. The existing
Coast Guard program for boarding officer training and qualification on
the use-of-force continuum could serve as a useful template. Use-offorce training first imparts the necessary knowledge and skill components and then uses realistic scenarios to test the trainee's knowledge,
skill, and judgment.27'
In drafting the SOPs and in the subsequent training, it will be
important to distinguish the role of aiding shipboard decision making
from the role of supplanting shipboard decision making with shoreside
The VTS National SOP explains that, in providing
direction.
navigational assistance services, "VTS contributes to the shipboard
decision-making process by giving navigational information'" including
specific warnings to vessels. 25 The Coast Guard's long-standing
hesitation to attempt to control vessels remotely from shore, or even to
advise them on particular courses to steer, is also reflected in internal
directives applicable to search and rescue missions. Echoing the VTS
272. The IMO VTS Guidelines make it clear that training and qualification must address
both knowledge and skills. IMO VTS Guidelines,supra note 10, annex 2, paras. 5.3.3, 5.4.3.
273. The IMO VTS Guidelines do not distinguish training levels for VTS supervisors. Id.
annex 2, para. 1.2.19.
274. Use-of-force training employs videos that present the trainee with a series of threat
scenarios that require the trainee to determine and apply an appropriate level of force consistent
with the continuum concept. See U.S. CoAsT GuARD, MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT MANUAL,
COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M16247.1 (series), ch. 4 (1997). The scenarios demonstrate the
dangers of both false positives (Type I errors, where trainees are likely to conclude that deadly
force is justified when it actually is not) and false negatives (Type II errors, where trainees are
likely to conclude that deadly force is not justified when it actually is).
275. VTS NATIoNAL SOP, supm note 16, para. 2.B.2.a, at 2-1.
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National SOP,27 the Coast Guard Supplement to the National Search and
Rescue Manual instructs than in cases where a mariner requests
navigational assistance:
In all situations, the standard to follow is to make sure any information
passed is prudent and based on fact, and never based on opinion or
The Coast Guard will not provide courses to steer
conjecture.
Additionally, any information passed to a mariner requesting assistance
should be reflected in the appropriate communications log. 7
It then adds the following Note:
The Coast Guard will not assume responsibility for navigating a vessel, but
it may provide the master of a vessel certain navigation information if
available as charted or published by a reputable source. In the field there is
a perception that passing navigational information to mariners is
discouraged because of the potential for liability. However, certain types of
navigational information may be passed ifit is accurateandreliable"'
Most organizations have identifiable cultures, which serve as a
force for stability rather than a catalyst for change. It might be the case
that if the present VTS "culture" is found to be unreasonably biased
against intervention-perhaps seeing the VTS role as strictly one that
informs and aids others who will make all of the necessary decisionsonly training will change it. Training and qualification scenarios that
require the VTS trainee to apply established criteria for providing
warnings and recommendations, and use the standardized phrases in
communicating each, would go a long way toward curing any reluctance
to use these less intrusive tools, while also building watchstander
confidence and competence. More demanding scenarios, using a variety
of environmental and traffic conditions, and even more importantly,
multiple vessels," 9 can be used to evaluate the trainee's judgment in
applying the statutory "justified in the interest of safety" standard and
improve competency in issuing directions using result-based terminology.
Finally, the scenarios should ensure that the decision to exercise control
is viewed not as a single discrete act but rather as a process that entails
communication, implementation, monitoring, reassessment, adjustment,
276. Id para. 3.B.4, at 3-2.
277. U.S. COAST GUARD,

ADDENDUM TO THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SEARCH AND
RESCUE SUPPLEMENT, COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION MI 6130.2D, para. 4.5.1, at 4-19 (2004).

278. Id.
279. Too often, policies on the exercise of control and training for the exercise of control
are discussed only in the context of single-ship navigation accident (allision or grounding) or twoship collision scenarios. The policy and training should also prove its adequacy in scenarios
involving more than two ships, perhaps including a recreational vessel not participating in the
VTS.
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and termination. Only those who have demonstrated competency across
the full range of scenarios should be authorized to issue directions.28
Any decision to increase the intervention posture of VTSs in the
United States will likely raise additional training and qualification issues.
In the course of its 1994 VTS rulemaking, the Coast Guard noted that a
number of comments by the public expressed concern about the level of
experience and expertise of VTS watchstanders:
Some comments felt that broad seagoing experience was necessary to
become a successful watchstander.
The Coast Guard recognizes that special and thorough training is
required to qualify as a Vessel Traffic Center (VTC) watchstander or watch
supervisor. Although broad seagoing experience is important, it is not
necessarily the only indicator or predictor of VTC watchstander
performance. Besides good seamanship skills, numerous other factors,
such as communications skills, geographic familiarity, and regulatory
knowledge make for a competent watchstander. Coast Guard training and
qualifications requirements for VTS watchstanders are aimed at ensuring
that all of these elements are present.
The Coast Guard ensures that each trainee receives and successfully
completes a thorough training and qualification program prior to assuming
duties as a watchstander. This training program includes numerous ship
rides to familiarize trainees with the VTS area and with local seamanship
practices."'
The concerns raised over the level of seagoing experience required of
VTS operators during the 1994 rulemaking are heard much less often
today, but they would almost certainly be raised again if CGVTSs began
to take a more aggressive posture on directing or controlling vessels. On
this question, the example of those foreign VTSs that employ only
licensed pilots or masters might well be studied.
V

CONCLUSION

The existing statutory authority strikes the optimal "control"
balance between the vessel and shoreside components and provides
needed flexibility for the Coast Guard to implement this important
280. Formal certification following completion of personal qualification standards and
board review might be required before a person is authorized to issue control instructions. Such
authority might also be restricted to VTS watch supervisors. To ensure actions can be timely
made and implemented, decisions to intervene should not require approval beyond the VTS
watch.
281. U.S. Coast Guard, Final Rule, National Vessel Traffic Services Regulations (VTS
Final Rules), 59 Fed. Reg. 36,316, 36,317 (July 15, 1994) (33 C.ER. pts. 1, 26, 160-165). The
VTS National SOP adds formal courses that generally track the IMO-IALA framework. See
VTS NATIONAL SOP, supra note 16, para. 8.B.2, at 8-2.
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waterways risk management tool. Similarly, the Coast Guard's current
regulations are adequate, if unnecessarily confusing in their use of VTS
activity terminology. Immediate "reform" efforts have focused, and
should continue to focus, on the Coast Guard's standard operating
procedures. The SOPs should be further developed and then used in
conjunction with case studies and scenarios across the full range of the
"continuum of vessel traffic management" activities to train vessel and
shoreside operators.
Intervention decisions must be based on the particular circumstances of the case, which will vary from one port or waterway to another.
Accordingly, much of the doctrine for exercising the authority to control
vessels must, like pilotage requirements,28 be developed at the local level,
in conjunction with the relevant harbor safety committee, and follow the
process and criteria set out in the PWSA. At the same time, we must
recognize that a given merchant vessel may call on a number of ports in
the United States and abroad and may therefore come within the areas of
responsibility of dozens of VTSs each year. Like the expectations
regarding the relationship of vessel masters, watch officers, and pilots,
expectations regarding the role of VTSs should be coordinated at the
international and national level.

282. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 53 US. (12 How.) 299, 319, 2008
AMC 2674, 2685 (1851) (distinguishing "local" matters from those requiring a uniform national
rule).

